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This manual gives a detailed technical description of the IDIOT intrusion detection system from the COAST
Laboratory at Purdue University. It is intended to help anyone who wishes to use, extend or test the IDIOT
system. Familiarity with security issues, and intrusion detection in particular, is assumed.
Chapter 1
Introduction
This document is the users guide for the IDIOT intrusion detection system developed at the COAST
Laboratory.
This section will remain shon because a much better description of what IDIOT is, the design goals
and the model it works undeccan be found in the documents included in the doc/IDIOT directory in the
IDIOT distribution.
The files in that directory are:
kumar-spaf-overview.ps [KS94] This report examines and classifies the characteristics of signatures used
ill misuse intrusion detection. The document describes a generalized model for matching intrusion
signatures based on Colored Petri Nets. This is the first document you should read. We recommend
that you stop reading this guide now and return here when you have finished reading that document.
kumar-intdet-phddiss.ps [Kum95] Sandeep Kumar's original Ph.D. thesis. An in-depth description of
intrusion detection, the theoretical considerations behind IDIOT, and a description of the model that
was used to implement IDIOT.
taxonomy.ps [KS95] This report classifies UNIX vulnerabilities based on the signatures required to detect
them, and gives the best overview on how to write IDIOT patterns with examples from real UNIX
vulnerabilities. We recommend that you read this document last before you start writing patterns of
your own.
IDIOT_work.ps [ES96b] This report outlines the structure of IDIOT, explaining how the components fit
and work together. It also describes results from profiling IDIOT against two audit trails and suggests
possible approaches to optimizing the program.
debugging.lDIOT.ps [ES96a] This report describes changes made to IDIOT code which allow a greater
flexibility in the amount and type of debugging information generated. It also describes a sample
IDIOT program that has been included and a utility for separating the debugging information based
on its origin, pattern or server.
Chapter 2
Quick Start
The infonnation in this chapter will help you get IDIOT running as fast as possible. However, we suggest
that you read the rest of the material in this document before you attempt to use IDIOT.
The following steps must be executed to install IDIOT correctly:
• Read this document at least once
• Edit the Makefile to set the appropriate values for your site
• Give the command ''make C2_appl"
• Make sure that praudi t is in your path
• Run IDIOT
For the rest of this section we give an example of how to install and run IDIOT for the first time.
We start in a directory that contains only the IDIOT tar file:
lolariD. 51 , pwd
I •..,rc!or Ito"""" /Qoll"",/IDlor
" ..lad" 5~ , 15
idio~. tar
Extract the files from the tar file:
solaria 5J , tlr "tv idiot .•I.
x doc. 0 byou, 0 upe blocks
x doc/lllllnud. 0 bytn, 0 to.,., blocks
"doc/""",uol/doco.p~, !JS6S6 by~eo. 165 ~o"" bloc","
"docIIDIC1I'. 0 by~u. 0 tap" blot","
" dot/IDlarlku:llor_J.ntcl.t_phddlos.p~. 903656 byte~. 1766 to"" blot","
"doC/IDIOTIl<u=ae-apd-tvorvi"".pa, eH7BO byteo. lll6 ~a"", blocke
"dot/IDIOT/t""onomy,po, 645109 byta•• 1260 to"" blotke
"C~Jlu~e""". 0 byu•• 0 ta"", blocl<.o
"C1"'pattern5/treatlnll"_~atl.c1_.cript., 440 by~n. 1 u"" blotk~
" C1....pa~totTUl/"""c"t1nll"-prOll"•• 1616 bytu, 4 topo blonl<.o
" C2...,POttotnSllpr_col'Y_filu. 1295 byto~. 3 topo blocks
" C2J1<1.tcern5lprint-llIknodo. 916 bytea. 2 to.,., bloC","
" C2...Il"ttorna/utuid_wriu._ao~u.ld, 3026 bytea. 6 tape blocks
x C2J1<ltterna/wr.ltino-to-""ecutolllo_Hl•• , 2671 bytaa. 6 topo block.!;
"C2..,Il<1ttern.a/writJ.nll_to_noncntned_fil••. 1711 by~•••• tapo biock.o
J< app., 0 by~e~. 0 tap" blocks
" oppa/profile,C. 1831 bytn, 4 Up" block.o
" app./jill.C. 1625 by to., 4 top" blocl<.o
" oth.r_Co~ottotnS, 0 bytn, 0 tOpo block.o
" othar_CoJlottarna/3.failod_lO'\llna, 1166 by~.. , 3 tapo blocka
r othar_C2J1UtotnS/occ.sa-opon-tO-~""",-path-dlU-lnode •• 4512 by.... 9 topa bloclts
J< othor_C2...pottorno/bin-lIlOil. 2534 by teo. 5 topo bloc""
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x otbet_C2..-ttcnl:Ofc!mrkc-w115cn. 2813 ~t 6 tm.,., blocks
x othot_C2..-tteE'J",.{dir-brO>lmer. 1266 byt 3 .0.,., blockD.
x other_C2..-.torn:rfci<mt.£01lcw_s'r'l"_linu. 2938 byteo. 6 tmpa blo.u
x other_C2Jlottemaffoiled-ou. 307 bytoo. 1 .opo bloc""
x otbar_C2..-ttornoff1ngor. 1041 bytu. 3 top<> blocks
x otbor_C2Jl.tltterrnofl". 1525 by too. J tapo blo.""
" other_C2..-tto:m..r;fpouwd._Fat.o.k. 1593 ~teo. 4 topo bloc","
" othar_C2..-ttarn.r;fptiv_pgm_in_usaropo.". 575 b:r'tu. 2 topo bloc","
"other_C2J1atteE'J\Ofrcw. 2185 byt..o. 5 topo blocks
" 0.hor_C2Jlottorn.of4etid-PlJIIll'-.ont-apo",,-ahell, 1076 byteS, J tapa blocks
" other_C2...:1'ot.orn.o{oholl_sttip._o.ta.k. 532 ~t..o, 2 topo blocks
x orher_C2JlottemsJrftp. 12H bytto. 3 .ope blocks
" other_C2...:1'ottttnaftiming_ottock. 1122 ~.e.G, 3 "'PO blocks
x othor_C2...l10....nur/writ1ng-to-non"""ad_dot_Lil... 1057 byteo, 3 to"", blocko
.. audit_troi15. 0 ~t..o. a toplt Mo.""
x oudit_troi!Gf.tenlno;r-aetld-••tipt".audi._trail. 42632 ~teo, U tapa block.s
.. audH_troihfextcuting_progo.audit_troil. 20389 bytn. 40 topo blockG
x oudit_ttoiloflpt_cO'PY_file•. audlt_troil. 1125555 ~t.... 2199 toPe blocks
.. audit_troibfprint_llIkn.od.a.oudit_ttul, 23070 bytaB, 46 tOplt block.o
" oudit_troi!Gfaatuid-writn-oetuid.oudit_troil. 15496 ~t... , 31 taPO blocks
" oudit_troilstwriting-to-exe.utoble-Hlu.audit_trail. B975 ~te4, 18 tope blotks
"OUcUt_troi!Gfwritln",-to-noncnmad-Lilto.audit_troil. B376 bytn. 17 .apo block.!;
"C2_Sarvtr.C. 15997 by teo. J2 tope blot""
I< Plcliat.h. 2007 bytn. 6 .opo bloc:ko
"potttrn.l. 8072 byteo, 16 tope blockll
"C2_Strvtr.b, H25 byteo. 7 tope blo.1tD
I< &><pt.C. lU48 byto". 29 topo blocks
"proudit.h, J17t bytco. 7 topo blocko
" C2_app1.C. 5500 bytoa. 11 tapo blo.kG
"IP_servet.c. 47532 bytn. 93 taPO blocl<5
" C2_evtnu.h. l22S? by tea. 24 top<> blotkG
" oh.....aud1•.pl. 16986 by...". 34 .aptl block.o
"utilitieo.C, 0086 bytes. 0 tope blocltD
" utUo.h. 3248 bytoa. 7 tOplt bloc:k.o
"HokeHl... 9519 byt..o. 19 top" bloc:ko
" PL_IUst.C. 10B7 by teo. J tap<> blo.""
.. abo_clon.h. 1282 byteo. J topo blocko
"pat.y. 74752 by teo, 116 tope Mo."'"
I< DL.,.llist.h. H45 bytt". J t ..pe blocks
"pattern.h, 14607 bytos. 29 tope blo.1tI;
.. ~1:A1ltre. 24 byt.... 1 t ..pe block.o

























Make the C2_appl application:
"olaria 56 \ fuar/locol{gnufJMko C2_oppl
fOpt/smr".p .... fbln/CC -><pq +d -. C2_app1.C
·C2_appl.C·. line 130, W......ing lAnoch:roni"..I, Pormol argument potternfilt o~ type cltar'
in .011 to C2..5arvot::pane_fU,,[cltar·1 h beLng paoood conot .h.t·.
·C2_appl.C·. lin.. 13B, NO.": ~.. ·CC -migration· ~Ot e>Ore On anachroniolllO.
·C2_appl.C·. line 144, Warning lAnaci:>:ronioOl" Formol orgument file of .ype cltar' in cmll
to C2_Serve.. ::dlllnlL..fH.. l"hat·1 is being POSOed eonst chor·.
2 W5rnlng[ol detoeted.
feptfS1J>l"".profb1nfCC -><PI! ~d -t C1_servn.c
·/.... rflne!uclo/oy.. fsy......croa.h·. lino 100: Warning [An...i:>:ronioml: .... toq>t to ..ad..Hna
.... jor withouc uolDg luncluf.
·/u../in.ludo/ayo/ay"....." ..04.b·. Hno 100, Nato, Type 'CC -",igre.ion· £0.. OIOr .. on
""".h:ron' ........
·/u../inclucl.. /sya/sy"mocra".b·. lino 109: W..rning [An.o.hronioml: "'ttoq>. to raddin..
<Dinor without u.ing lundef.
·/u.r/in.lude/oystsys......too.h·. Hn.. 115: W..rning [Mo.lltoni""'l: Att....,. to ..adtHne
mokad...... without usinll lunde!.
3 Warning[ol clnectad.
y..." _d -v pat.y
2 rules n"""r r ..duced
contlict., 11 ohittfreduce. 2 roduc"frodu.e
feptfSlllfo'l'profbLnfCC -__d -t -0 yo"c 0 y.tllh.c
·pattern.h·. lin.. 4J2, W......ing lAnach:ronis",], T""'POt..ry Ct..ated for arlJWlll'Rt nawt in
coIl to T.-ble<in.": :pu.hlint').
·pottern.h·. lint 4J2, Note: Typo .ct: - ..igr..c1oo· tar .... re on ono.hroni ......
1 W.........ngl.) dou.ted,
1"" pattern.l
fOptfS1J>l"o'I.pro/b.in/CC -__d _. _0 1"".0 l"".yy.t
·pott..m.h·, Hno 4H, w.m.ing PlnachroniaOl]' Tcq>oto.ry ct..Oted lor ..rgument nowt in
coIl to Tobla<int>: :puohlint'l.
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·pD~~ern.h". line 4)2, "o~o: 'I'yPe 'CC -<:>.illu~lon· for .... re on ......."hronu......
1 Werninq(el dDte<:~ed.
10p~fSllN'ri""pro/bln/CC _" -lCP\I +d Il:<Pr.C -0 ""Pr.o
·pDtrorn.h". lI.no 432: WDrnin<;l (-":1Achroni"..l: 'l'=p:lruy crDDced lor Ar~n~ n_~ in
call. ~a Tablo~in~~,,,,,,,,hllnt~l.





Make sure that the praudi t command in in the execution path.
"Olaci.. , '<hlch pr..udi~
fu"r/"bin/praudi~
"ol..do. 65 , u~ p..rh_(SPAth l""r/obbll
Run [he C2_appl aplication to test the program. In this case we will compile, link and run a sample
pattern and audit trail shipped with IDIOT. Parse the pattern:
"oluia 51 , _/C2_appl
tini> parae C2J1AUern"/crea~inl/-"etid-"cript,,
fAreing Hlo C2...Jle~urn.a/crea~inll-.... rid'''cripta
InDide A"'~ reduced expr, prin~tl·lJ.er J.d td Me eucceoefully ro~~d'ed Uile h\n·.
unlf1ed...rok-~ge~JlIJIDI1.uniHed...tck-~llet_ruI.L..JW{Elll









CC 'pic -G _q _0 cr_oo~i<lJ>gmol.eo cr_aotidJlQ'llO..C
"cr_oni<i...P!l"=o.C'. lI.ne 290, Warninq IAnAcbroniD..l' Fo"""'l ar,"""",nt val o( ~ype cMr'
in call to C2_cr_ee~l.d-PQtllO._Token::aOGlon_row..JlAHE[chu·1ie being pareed conn char'.
"cr_"eti<i...P!l"=o.C'. line 290: Note, Typo "CC _mil/ration" (or more on "".chron'''''''.
1 WarnJ.nl/lrl detected.
Done co~Uinl/ cr.... ati<l...s>\lmD.C
I""ide croate pattern.
Ina.t.ntiared new" pattern i ..... t""co for cr_.etid....==e




Run the pattern with the corresponding audit trail.
tini. run .udit_traila Icr~.tinl/_.otic:l_.cript•. ~udit_tr.il
Sh......"dlt: ..ill ""ecute the followinq coorolOtld: taU .0 .."dlt_tr.ila/cr.....Un<;I-oet1d-acr,pu .•udit_trail I pnudir -r I
lJ~er ic:l 8n h"" "ucc... fully aotid·r<l. tile /.IOOrdor/ho=ll/o11"'"I ........a
lJur id an haa oucc~.. f"lly .ctid·ed file l.toOrdor/ha....190Uwo/hbb.hbb
V.or 1d an ha. autcOD,,(ully "etic:l'ed file l.mordorlh"""'lqol1umftct.ccc
Ur~r id an Me GucceG.fully .~tid·ed HIe f • ..,rdarlb"""'lqollum/c:lc:li:l..c:Ic:Ii:l.
ShOWAUdit, 110 ot dropp&d ovent" • 147
SbO'olAUc:llt: Could not foU ..... the next ."dit HIe at ./sho...udit.pl line ~2.
NOTE: Ifyou get an error message of the formDon' t handle events of type 0 yet! then




There are currently three classes of pattern being shipped with IDIOT. They are:
I. Written and tested patterns. These are patterns that we have written and tested and can present audit
trails known to trigger the patterns.
2. Written but not tested. These patterns were written but could not be tested either through lack of time
or limitations in the underlying audit trail.
3. Theoretical patterns. These patterns are written to demonstrate a particular point, but cannot be
handled by the IDIOT system currently.
Each of the follOWing sections describes the different pattern types.
3.1 Written and Tested patterns
These patterns have been written and tested. They are shipped as working patterns to demonstrate IDIOT's
capabilities, and to be used in a real environment.
These patterns can be found in the C2_patterns directory. The audit trails to exercise these patterns
are in a directory audit_trails under the main IDIOT distribution directory. Each pattern has an
associated audit file named <pattern_name>_audiLfile in the audit-trails directory.
3.1.1 Detecting when programs create setuid programs. PATIERN:creating-setid-scripts
Very few programs should create setuid files and system administrators often run programs that search the
file system looking for unauthorized setuid files. This pattern will warn when a program creates a seuid file.
Vulnerabilities detected
Many vulnerabilities can sometimes be detected with this pattern.
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State machine
Figure 3.1 illustrates the pattern.
CHMOD
Stan -',---- --I
Figure 3.1; State machine
Pattern being used















Note: the final clause in this guard would be best written as:
(this [OBJ_NEWMODSj & 06000) && (this [OBJ_NEWMODS] & 0111)
Discussion
The pattern described in this document was tested under Solaris 2.4 using the BSM C2 audit trail generated
by the audi td daemon.












• setuLd and •• t .. ld
I und"fin.d (••tuid and id
I but not ""e t.>blel
I G.t rid o~ tho fihs create<!.
<1'1 ......ao bbb.bbb ccC.ccc ddd.ddd
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The execution of IDIOT server with the audit trail generated for user gollum produces the following
output:
U~er id 8~J hu ~ueeeutully oeeid'cd HIe I.mordor/home/ll'ellumlllfta.allft
U~er id all ha~ ~uece~~tully ~eeid'cd fUe l.mordor/ho"""lI'ollUlll/bbb.bbb
U6er id 8ll hu .ueeeeotully ~eeid'cd. file 1 ...,rdor/hClllllO/lI'ollumleee.eee
U~er id 8ll hu ~ueeentully ~eeid'cd HIe l.mordor/h"""'/goll"""ddd.ddd
3.1.2 Detecting the execution of attack programs. PATIERN: executing-progs
Sometimes users import attack scripts and run them with little or no modifications. We can detect the
execution of well known attack scripts and programs by searching for well-known program names.
Vulnerabilities detected
CA-93:14 Internet Security Scanner will scan sites for potential security holes.
CA*** Crack tool for obtaining passwords.
State machine





Figure 3.2: State machine
Pattern being used
exrern "er Buen""'" InrI:





printfl·User 1d \d ho.••ucttnfully executed \Oln'. RUlli'. I'IlLL...PIICG1:
,'
• The routine Buen""", b deHned as a eall to the IJ)'n"", function
• base""""'. Given a pointer to a null-terminated elulroner otrinll' rhot
• eentains a p4rh n""",. basen......... ll r,,"urns a pointer to the l ... t d_nt





1_ I thb[ElUl.I • 11''' RUlli'. thb{RUIDI u, pilOO. Ba.en...... lthh(PIlOO]I ~~
7
l'ULL_fROO • tllblfROOI "
(PROO .- "COps· J I fROG .- .gimr>e" II PltOO .- ·teae"·); ,
entl ""e.:;
Note: this pattern can also detect the [CA-95:06] advisory on the SATAN tool. This can be done by
adding FROG =;;satan" to the last clause in the guard.
Discussion
How does this pattern work? It is composed of essentially one transition - when an EXECVE occurs, it
checks to see if the executed program is one of the prohibited list. If it is, then the pattern has terminated,
and the post action is taken. This prints out a friendly informational message.
We need to know two things while executing this pattern; the name of the program being exec'd and
the user id of the user executing the program. When the execve system call is executed, the name of the
program to execute is specified. This is recorded in the audit file. We can access this program name using
the this [FROG] construct, which returns the program name from this audit record. We record the full
program name in the variable FULL_PROG so it can be displayed in the post action. This variable is of type
s tr. which is a string class from the Rogue Wave library.
The user id is returned using the this [RUID] construct. It extracts the uid field of the audit record.
We assign it to a local variable so it can be displayed later in the post action.
To actually detect running a specific program, we use the pattern matching operator =-. This works as
in PERL. In this case, we are only interested in exactly the filename specified.
The pattern described in this document was tested under Solaris 2.4 using the BSM C2 audit trail
generated by the auditd daemon. An attacker, a user called golLum, has the following files in his home
directory:
<;Iollum , 1" _1
-ol:..,,-r-- 2 <;Iollum <;Iollum
-r-n/-r-- 1 <;Iollum <;Iollum
-noxn/_r_" 2 <;Iollum <;Iollum
1~ 1 \loll"", \lollum
10 Nov 26 16,13 cta.""
45 Nov 26 16,14 """loit"
10 Nov 26 18,13 Iliddlln..har<:!"
5 Nov 26 18:14 Ilitl<len_oy,o -> encl<"





The execution of IDIOT on the audit trail generated for user golLum on produces lhe following output:
Uaee itl 033 haa ,,"ccuaf"lll' uecllt"tI I . ..,ttlor/home/<;lollu:n/cnck
Uset iel ell hao ,,"ccene~ully ""eclltml. l.motdOt/ho"",/<;Iollum/ctack
The program has detected two of the three executions of the program crack. In fact, the two instances
detected are the first two lines of the exploi t script. It is unfortunate that we cannot detect which execution
produces which line of output. As shown next, the audit trail events generated for both are identical.
8
header.UO.2.""ecveI21 •• S"", Nov 26 18:16:12 1~95. - 250009000 ....c
pilCh.' .llIOrdorthcm>a/voUum/crBcl<
attribuee. 100764. vollum. voUum. ~ e SJ52Jl. ~OSB2. 0
~ubjeet.vollum.vollum.vollum.voUum.vollum.1i720.1ae01.0 5 "'Olarill
reCurn ....uc"e"•• O
hellder.1l9.2.e><e=e121 .• Sun Rov 2610,16,12 U95. - ~U002000 "",ec
pilch. I .mordor IhCWl>e/vollWll/crllcl<
Iletr lbuce. 100764. vollum. vollum. ~ 05J52~J. 40502. 0
...ubjeet.vollum.\Io11um.Voll""'.VollUlll.VollUlll, 11721,10001.0 5 "'Olarill
reCum. Buc"eu. 0
3.1.3 Ipr can copy a file over any arbitrary file: PATTERN: Ipr_copyJiles
The line printer program can be made to overwrite arbitrary files on the system. Ipr is asetuid root program
that copies files to print into the spooler directory. The files are then printed from the spooler directory.
If the -5 option is used, the Ipr program creates a link to the file in the spool directory. However, the
temporary names created in the spool direcmry will wrap around after 1000 print jobs.
By forcing these names to wrap around, the Ipr program can copy an arbitrary file over a link which
points to a destination file. This will cause the destination file to be overwritten, even if the user did not
have permission to access that file.
Vulnerabilities detected
8lgm -Advisory-3.UNlX..lpr.19-Aug·199l1pr can overwrite any arbitrary file.
State machine
~gure 3.3 illustrates the pauerp..
o
Figure 3.3: Detect lpr copying arbitrary files
Pattern being used
,.
• Dec"", ... if Ipr criu to oV<lrvrlte " tUe OlItmLde o~ lu"r/"pool
• I\lI.rl< Cro...bie Februa<y 1996
.,
e"Cern int inTreel ... cr.... tr),
e"Cem int 'ru"...prinC("'Crl:
9
extern int "trmatchl"u:. "ttl;




printfl"U"er \d "tte""ted to copy over file \o\n", JUflD. l'll..El,
/0 the invari....t "tateo that ve "ill clelet.. toke"" in th.. at"te
° _thine onte the prote"" .."it". H lpt e"ito, tbere'" no point
" continuin; co try to _<tb for the "ttack.0'












thi,,[EiIlI] .0 ". PID. chi,,[PID] "P!<DG. tbis[PRDG] "
RlllD • thi ... rRllID] ~~





thh[&J<)I.] • 0 ,~ thhiPID] • PID ,,~ PILE. tbi"rOB.:J] ....
lin'I'rael"-/v"r/apaol/", tbhlOB.:Jll .01,
Discussion
The lpr command is a setuid root program that places files in the spool directory on behalf of users.
Typically it places a copy of the file in the spool directory, but if given the -s option, it will create a
symbolic link to the file in the spool directory. If given the -q option, it will place the file in the directory.
but not enqueue it for printing.
The files in the spool directory have a very predictable name. The name of a spool file starts with cf for
a control file and df for its associated. data file_ For example, executing the command lpr -Paz -q -s
. aliases (where oz is the name of our local printer), creates the two files in the /var / spool / lpq/oz
directory:
- ....- .... ---- 1 d.o.emon doemon
1~ 1 rOOt do""",..
152 Peb 19 11:54 cfA21By"vl.. ,co.purdue,e<ht
23 Feb 19 17,54 d!A27Byavln.t".purdua.e<ht -. /homelmcro"bia/.alia"e.
The number after the cfA and dfA part of the file names will increment after every print command,
Thus. after a thousand print commands, the file dfA278yavin. cs" purdue" edu will be reused.
The essence of this attack is to create a link in the spool directory to a file you want to overwrite. Then.
execute athousand prints until the number in the spool directory filename wraps around, then print the file
10
you want to overwrite with. The lpr program will write over the existing link, and as it is setuid root, it
can overwrite whatever that link pointed to.
The IDIOT pauern presented above detects this attack by seeing if the lpr program overwrites any files
outside of the /var / spool directory tree. If so, it prints a warning. The audit trail in Solaris encodes the
final destination filename when accessing a link, so this is available to the pattern.
A sample run is showll below:
dnb run ...udlt_dattlflpr_toW_fl-le ......."dit_dau
5h""a"dit, "ill ~a=ta til" fOll""ing t"......"d, taU .0 ..."di.t_dau/lpr_toW_filt......."dit_dat... I puudit _r 1
Sh""audit, >I... of dropped events • 12~
Uaer n? attempted to topy ovar lile Iho""/mcrosbie/tq>/Ove.....it""'"
User 12? att...,.,ted to copy over file IIl"""'/"",roabie/l:rri>/oven<ri.""",
.ini~ Pr09r"", endod
3.1.4 Print all executions ofmknod. PATIERN: print-mknods
If a user creates a device, it is possible to access the disk or other system resources without proper
authorization. For example, if a user created a device in a local directory with the same device numbers as
the root disk, then that user could access and change any information on the disk.
Pattern State Machine
The state machine is very simple and is shown in Figure 3.4.
MKNOD




• PrLn. all ... ucce.... ful lllknodQ.
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When a device is created, the mknod command is used. A parameter specifies the mode used to create the
device. If this mode indicates that this is a block special or character special file, then the message is primed.
A utility routine isdev () is used to check the mode of the device being created. If this is special file
(i.e. a device), isdev () returns TRUE. If this occurs, and the MKNOD succeeded, then the user ID and
path of the device are recorded and displayed.
Output from IDIOT
IDIOT produces the following omput when presented with the attack audit trail:
tinl> nul cudlt_dat'l"",,,od.audit_data
Sh""au<!.i", ..ill ""ecut" "he followlrtq coomcnd, "aU .p
iludit_da"almlcnod.clI<!.it-da"a I praudJ.c -r I
11."r id 0 .ucc"••fully cr"ated a devic" in
Ih""...'"",rO"bi"Io>yIDIOT/alldl"_dat"l""" .
Sh""audit, No of dropped """nt•• 79
3.1.5 Detecting when setuid programs write to setuid or executable programs. PATIERN:
setuid~writes·setuid
Very few seruid programs should write to other seruid or executable files, and many attack scenarios share
these characteristics. Rogue setuid programs will often create seruid shells or alter system owned executable
programs to alter their behavior. Hence, it is desirable to detect whenever such behavior and report it as
SUSpICIOUS.
This pattern will warn when a seruid program creates or opens a seuid file (or executable program) for
write. It will also report when a setuid program opens a seruid or executable file for read only, using the
open system call, and specifies that the file should be created if it does not already exist.
Vulnerabilities detected
Many of the vulnerabilities listed below can sometimes be detected with this pattern. In partiCUlar, when
any of these seruid programs creates or opens a setuid or executable file.
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8Igm~Advisory-3.UNIX.lpr.19-Aug-1991 Any user with access to Ipr can alter system files and thus
become root. We can only detect the vulnerability if Ipr creates or opens for write a setuid or
executable file.
8Igm~Advisory-ll.UNIX.sadc.07-Jan-1992 sadc can be used to create files in normally unwritable di-
rectories. sadc normally runs egid sys, and therefore can be used to create files in group sys
writeable directories. We can only detect the vulnerability if sadc creates or opens for write a setuid
or executable file.
8Igm-Advisory-5.UNIX.maiI.24~Jan-1992 A race condition exists in binmail, which allows files to
be created in arbitrary places on the filesystem. These files can be owned by arbitrary (usually
system) users. We can only detect the vulnerability ifbinmail creates or opens for write a setuid or
executable file.
8Igm-Advisory-6.UNIX.mail2.2-May-1994 The old race condition still exists in the patched binmail,
which allows files to be created in arbitrary places on the filesystem. These files can be owned by
arbitrary (usually system) users. We can only detect the vulnerability if binmail creates or opens
for write a setuid or executable file.
8Igm-Advisory-15.UNIX.mail3.28-Nov-1994 A hole in binmail allows files to be created as root. We
can only detect the vulnerability ifbinmail creates or opens for write a setuid or executable file.
CA-95:05 Sendmail Vulnerabilities February 22, 1995. This advisory supersedes all previous CERT
advisories on sendmail. The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of several problems
with sendmail, one ofwhich is widely known. The problems occur in many versions ofsendmail.
We can only detect the vulnerability if sendmail creates or opens for write a setuid or executable
file.
CA-95:08 Sendmail v.5 Vulnerability August 17, 1995. In sendmail version 5, there is a vulnerability
that intruders can exploit to create files, append to existing files, or execute programs. We can only
detect the vulnerability if sendmail creates or opens for write a setuid or executable file.
State machine
Figure 3.5 illustrates the pattern.
Pattern being used
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The pattern described in this document was tested under Solaris 2.4 using the BSM C2 audit trail generated
by the audi td daemono The following setuid programs were created:






,. eteste s aetuLd """tutabl" HI" .,
tr"et(OtesH.e1". S_IS\JID I S_IRIIX\1






'0 Cteste " " .. <uid prO<Jram "'
optm("te..2.t1"0 O_CIUl1I.'I', S_ISUID I S_IRWlCU I S_IW\;RP I,
,. Open the ."tuid prO<Jr......rooted by pr<>;,ram t".tl "f
optm(Otut1,do, O-.JUMIII:
An attacker. a user called gollum, ran these two program in order.
The execution of the IDIOT server on the audit trail generated for user gollum on produces the
following output:
s"tuid prO<Jr .... /hO..../kr~ul/tntl treated/opened for writ .. th ..
• e~id or entotahlo fUo ',mo~t/homo,gol1um1tutL.el,
s"tuid prOllU=O "'OIl>t,kr"ul/tnt2 treated/opened for writ .. th..
utuld or e"..totahI.. HIe / _mordor/home/gollum/test2 .eI.
sotuid pr09t"'" /ho.... /knul/t""t2 treated/opened lor ...ite the
~etuid or e"etotahI" fUe 1,.,.,nIor/homo/gollumlte.el.el.
3.1.6 Writing to Executable Files. PATIERN: writingMto-executable-files
Writing to an executable file is often evidence of viral behaviour. A virus may attempt to affect a program
by inserting code at the start of the file which will be executed'before the program contained in the code.
This is very common on MSDOS machines. However. a UNIX system may still be vulnerable to this type
of attack if executable files are left in place with write permission for users or groupso
Vulnerabilities detected
Any activity in which an executable file is written to.
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Pattern State Machine
The pattern is very simple. For each process that is EXECed, the pattern detects writes to a file by that









• Doteee prD<j'romll wrlti"" to exe""tal>l" files "hieh lMy be ""
, ir:ldic~tion o~ vir"l behe.viour




pottem viruo ·Pr09romo writing to "",",,"tal>10 file. (vlr"l beh"vlor)' priority 10
ir:lt PID. l!llID, /. p"tt"m 10eo.l v"rial>lu. =y be initiolhed.• /
Gtr FILl':. FROG,
ot~te ~torr, ofter_oxec. violnion,
,. poot "ction oi~ly reporto on att"ek ./
po~t_"etion (
printf!·Proqro.m h running,,~ WID ld "rote to the e"e""toble fHe h.I"-,
PROG, EllID, FILE]:
,. There con be ~. 1 invariont•• /
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/0 this invariant kill. a token if it9 eorrespondin\l porent e:dts 0/





L ( PID· this(PID);
end "",it,
end Unt_inv;
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EUID • !;hie (WID); ]
Coo exec,




























1_ ( .hia(URl m "",, /" if this opera.'on suoceeded "/
pm • !;hlo(PIO] " /. and this PIO OI&tchos that ot tho oxoc "/
PILl! m thia(OB.J1 ~, /0 rftlllO!Olbar tbia fllolUl.llllO Of






















The pattern seems complex, but is essentially very simple. The pattern starts by detecting the execution
of a new process using the EXECVE transition. From this after_exec state, it detects any open calls that
could potentially write over a file which has its execute permission bits set. The isexec function is in
utili ties. C and returns TRUE if a file is executable. This can be computed by information about the
opened file stored in the audit trail. The types of open call detected are:
• OPEN_W open for write.
• OPEI:LWC open for write and create ifnot present.
• OPEN_WT open for write and truncate to zero size if present.
• OPIDLWTC open for write and create and truncate to zero size.
• OPEN..RW open for read or write.
• OPEN...RWC open for read or write and create ifnot present.
• OPEN_RWT open for read or write and truncate to zero length.
• OPEN...RWTC open for read or write and create if not present and truncate to zero size.
If any of these occur and the file is executable, we could have potential viral activity on the system, It
could also indicate a attempt to install a trojan horse on the system. This would be a version of a program
that had similar functionality but installed a malicious piece of code.
Discussion
The pattern will only detect a process being executed that overwrites executables. A series ofshell commands
to overwrite an executable won't be detected, because each shell command results in a new process with a
new PID. The PID attribute of the tokens won't be unifiable.
Why does this pattern not detect WRITE events? In the Solans BSM audit trail the write events are
subsumed under the OPEN event. So the audit trail for a write looks as follows (output ofpraudi t):
pa~h. IhCQe/"",~a.bi"'....IDIlI'I',audit_daU./"""""tl>bla
attribute, iOO'11, "",~aab1e.""'raable_ 83 08638. 19J 085. 0
aubj"c". _2."",~oabie,,,,,,ro.bia.,,,,,~oabi,,,,,,,,ro~bia,20085.0.0 0 0.0.0.0
racurn.suCCUS,4
The audit trail was gathered with the fw audit mask flag. This gathers data about file writes. The open
caB is recorded, but the wri te caB is not. The above audit trail corresponds to the following code fragment
from exploit-write. c:
iff (fdoapan(·.,axecutlil>i,,·. O_RDh'lUI < 01 (
perrorl' opc>n: '1;
""itnl'
princ!('E:>:plai'" ..... iting co executo.bl".. \n·l,
iff ""'iteUd. ·alxdaf·, 61 < 61 {
perrarl' ....n .. ' '1,
eIIi"lll;
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Thus, we are forced to detect writes to execurable files by detecting the opening of the file, and not the
actual write.
This pattern can also be written without the EXECVE transition. In effect it would then check every
write on the system to see if it overwrites an executable file.
3.1.7 Writing to nonowned files. PATTERN: writing-to-nonowned-files
Users often create files in their home directories that are world writable. This is often because of a umask
setting that does not disable the world write bits. Or, users may be sharing information via world writable
files. Either way, this is a potential avenue for attack, as any information can be written into a non-owned
file for later retrieval. This may allow an attacker to hide stolen information or plant a trojan horse in another
user's directory. In the worst case, an attacker could place a ++ into a world-wrirn.ble . rhosts file owned
by another user, leaving that user's accoum open (0 abuse.
Pattern State Machine
The state machine for this pattern is presented in Figure 3.7.
OPEN..RWTC
Figure 3.7: State machine for pattern to detect writing to
nonowned files
Pattern code
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1_ ( chio[EIIR] .0 ". /" che <lcoion o.,e.ee<l.ed 0'
thi.[ODJ_OWlIEIlJ ,_ tl>..iGlEUUlJ ~ .. '" olft'ld"nhipo don"t ....t,," 'f
PID' chia[PID] " '" r<mambo.r PIll of thia ptOC"U Of
EtIID thi"rEU:ID]'. /" t~r WJ:D of U5er ./






1_ ( thb(ERR] - a " this(OBJ_OWN'I!f() :_ this[ElJrD] ~~ PrO _ tl>15(PI0] ~Ii­






1_ I thin(ERR] _ a " thl.s(OBJ_OIQ;£II.) :. thi,,[EUID] " PID _ thblPID] "




1_ ( thi,,(ERRj .0'," tl>i5(OBJ_OiiNEII) :_ thie(EUItI] ,Ii- PID _ thb(PID) "
EU'ID _ thb lEUID] " PAnI _ th15(OBJ];
The pattern looks complex, but is essentially very simple. It detects any writes to a file that has an owner
field (OBJ_OWNER) that differs from the current effective user ID (EUID). If so, then the pattern reports the
write as being suspicious.
Discussion
This pattern is very simple. If the owner ofa file differs from the effective user ID of the process writing to the
file, then the post action reports this. Note, see the description for wri ting-to-executable-files
for more details on how the audit trail represents write events.
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3.2 Written but untested patterns
This section describes patterns that are written but untested. These patterns can be tested in the current
IDIOT implementation. but they are being shipped "as is" without any testing.
These patterns can be found in the other_C2_patterns directory under the main IDIOT distribution.
3.2.1 PATTERN: Ipd..deleteJiles
This pattern attempted to detect the CERT vulnerability outlined in CERT Advisory CA91: lO.a. The Ipd
line printer daemon can be made to delete files outside of the usual/var Ispool directory by ex.ploiting
a race condition. The race condition exists between the time the file is copied into the spool directory and
the time the file is removed from the directory. By changing the file to a link, it was possible to remove any
file on the system (as Ipd ran as root).
This pattern cannot be tested on our machines, because our lpd daemon has the fix. in place and we
cannot replace it without seriously disrupting the local printing environment in COAST.
However, the core transition in the pattern detects a delete (an UNLINK event) occuring with a destination
outside of a specified directory tree. It uses the inTree () external function (found in utilities. C to
match the file being deleted with the path prefix /usr / spool. If no match is found, then we conclude





t~ia[VIII] • 0 ~~ thl.[PID] • pm u. nu:. thio{OBJj ,~
tinTtu(·/usr,opool·. nLE) .0),
3.2.2 PATTERN: failed.su
This is a very simple pattern that reports all failed su attempts. Most system consoles also report similar
information. The pattern simply looks for SU events in the audit trail that have an err attribute of I.
indicating that they have failed.
3.2.3 PATTERN: finger
This pattern attempts to detect the finger program spawning a program other than finger. This was
motivated by the Internet wonn attack where the stack for the finger daemon was overwritten and caused
a new program to be spawned.
This pattern cannot be tested because it hard codes the inode value for the finger daemon fingerd
and the finger progrnm finger into the pattern. This will change from site to site, and from system to




This pattern attempts to detect a privileged program executing in user space. It does this using the
inUserSpace () external function.
3.2.5 PATIERN: rcw
This pattern attempts to verify integrity using Clarke-Wilson triples. More infonnation on this pattern and
Clarke-Wilson integrity triples can be found in Section 4.8.9 of the taxonomy. ps file in the doc / IDIOT
directory of the distribution.
3.2.6 PATIERN: sheII-scripl-atlack
Certain classes of attack make a shell execute and pass it strange command line arguments. A favourite
attack is to run a shell with a command line argument of -i. This gives an interactive shell. If, somehow,
a root shell can be spawned from a program with the -i option, an intruder has an interactive root shell on
the system.





thb[EIlRJ ·0 ". RUID ~ chta[RUID] "PROG • this[PlIOO] ......
hlinklchia[PROG]) ...... "hdl.....ttiptlthi,,[PROO]I ......
lBaun""",lchi"IPROO]1 .- .-_OJ'
The Basename () external function gets the actual name of the program being executed, with the
leading path component stripped off. If this name starts with a - symbol, the pattern indicates that something
suspicious has occured.
3.2.7 PATIERN: trtp
This pattern attempts to detect the tftp program accessing files outside of the tftpboot/ directory. This
could indicate an attacker using the 1FIP protocol as an attack vector.
This pattern has too many hardcoded constants to be useful in its current fonno It hardcodes the inode
numbers for the tftp program into the pattern. This should be changed to a more natural way of specifying
the name of the program.
3.2.8 PATIERN: bin-mail
This pattern attempts to detect the Ibin/mail program writing to a file that has its setid bit on, or is
executable. The pattern is very straightforward. The execution of the mail program is checked by the
transition on the EXECVE event. This is coded rather awkwardly - it detects the execution of the mail
program by looking at the inode of the argument to the exec () call. This is very system dependent, and
should be fixed.
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It then checks to see if that program opens any files for writing that have their execute bit set (using the
isexec () utility function) or have their setid bit set (using the issid () function). In either case, the
pattern triggers, indicating that the mail program probably has been subverted.
The invariant deletes any tokens associated with a process when that process exits. Thus. as a mail
program rons it generates a token in the machine, and once that program exits. all tokens associated with it
are deleted.
3.2.9 PATTERN: setid.pgms.cant.spawn.shell
A setuid program is not allowed to spawn a program with the effective user id unchanged. This would allow
attackers to subvert (say) the mail program, and make it spawn a shell with an effective user id of root.
This pattern is conceptually simple - if an EXECVE occurs of a shell program and the EUID changes
after the call, then trigger the pattern. However, because ofa weakness in Sun BSM auditing, this information
is not available. Instead, the pattern must monitor on a per-user basis - if a user executes a setid program
that then spawns a shell with a user id different from the user's, it triggers the pattern. This is less flexible
than the generic pattern, but is workable under Sun BSM auditing.
3.3 Theoretical patterns
This section describes theoretical patterns. These patterns cannot be tested in the current IDIOT implemen~
tation, and are written for instructive purposes only.
These patterns can be found in the other_C2_patterns directory under the main IDIOT distribution.
3.3.1 PATTERN: access-open-to-same-path-dilT-inodes
The general problem that this pattern tries to detect is that of an attacker to exploit the small window of
opportunity that exists between programs checking the validity of the files and the actual opening of the file
for writing. If an attacker can slow down the system, by running the program with a very high nice value,
for example, he can replace the file that has been validated with another of his choosing.
passwd -F Attack In SunOS
The passwd command can be directed to treat another file as the password file using the -F option. Before
opening this file for writing, and depending on the version of Unix one is using, the passwd program will
attempt to determine that the user can indeed read and write to the file by either opening it for read, calling
the access system call or calling the stat system call. If after this check has been completed, and before
the file is actually opened for writing, the user changes the path name to point to the real system password
file, the passwd program will operate on this file assuming it is still working with the original file.
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xterm Logging Attack
xterm needs to run as root because it needs to chown the tty it allocates to interact with the user. Logging
is a security hole because of the race condition between access check permissions to the logging file and
the logging itself. When given the -If option, xterm creates a file by calling the creat system call
and immediately changes the uid and gid of the file to match that of the user running the program and start
logging.
The problem appears when a user gives the following sequence of commands:
Ollcnod foo P • foo h ~Il@ FIFO ..- pipo
J<eOnl -H foo I cru~ will open til" FIFO ond block beeo".o choro
t io no proceoo reodinll tllo other etld of ~Ile pipe
"'" loo jull!<
1n _~ (etc/pos"W'd ~oo
cot jW1k I Nav thot th..r .. i~ 0 rudor .. t til" "thor ~id" of oho
•~ "ipe. tile c~ea~ "yot ..... caU re~urno and
t tile ne"t na~ement exectlted i" tile cl\:l>o<l oynem
I caU that ",ill chll.Jlllo the penni~~ion of tht Ittc/pOS,,>Jd
• ~Uo 00 ~tur.t ~ho "oo~ cll.Jl add II.Jld dele~e ontrie~.
Although more difficult to exploit, the patched version of xterm continues to have a similar problem.
The code described above got replaced by:
1 lflocc..~.(~cro..n-.10l1fi1". F_OKI I _ 01 I
2 Ie (....rno ._ =e>lTl





B Hracc.... (..creen_>loqfil@.F_OKl !. 0
9 II ..cc".. (.cr....n-.loq£il".'COKl !- 01
10 re~um,
n
12 Ie I (."re",,-.lOllfd.oponlocreen->lOllHle.O_WRom.yloJ-PFmD. 06Ull<OI
1] roturn,
The creat system call was replaced by the creat_as routine. This routine forks a child process
that changes its permissions to that of the user before it attempts to create the file, effectively eliminating
the previous race condition. Unfortunately, a race condition. although much harder to exploit, still exists
between the access call in line 8 and the open call in line 12. If a user can slow down this program
and time things right, after the access call succeeds, the log file can be replaced by a link to the real
letc/passwd file. The xterm process will open the letc/passwd for writing, and append to it the
information that it is supposed to log.
Vulnerabilities detected
CA-93:17 xterm Logging Vulnerability.
81gm 5/11/1994 The passwd command takes a -F oplion in SunGS.
Pattern State Machine


























Oet~tt~ th.. cl...uic ·"1n<\",,-of-oppeJrtunity' ""Ploit...tion. U~ed in
p ...uwd prOIl""'''' ...nd ",term 10llging bug.
>I...rk Cr05hl.. Nov. 19~5
Ivan Kr5ul NOV. 19~5
-,
..",tern int inod.. r~trl, ,. r .. turnS th~ inod.. for thi~ p ...rticul...r fil... ,
p ...tt ..rn ",OUPd! • ... c ..~n-open-to-~....... _pHh_diff_inod..s· priority 7
at ... t .. n rt,
nodup ot t .. atter_...cc..~~,
nodup ~t t ..... tter_cr.....te'
nodup ... t t .. ,,It.. r_open,
..... t .. dt..r_ex.... '
~t ... t" viol...tion,





tl>l ... invariant .....tn th... t th.. p ... tur.......r" "",t"hod "" long ... rhie
proc ..sc ... rUNun"
-,
neg inv...riant inv /' n~.. tiv.. inv...riant '/
at... t .. n ..rt_inv. fin... l_inv,
tr...... proc_"",it(""U'1
<- ... t ...rt_lnv,




TIlls tranBition i ... t ...k"n H th" ex......... d ..... n .. t ruult in an error <U\d til..
proqr "","CUtl-ng b ... tvid rOot. W.. U ••••• not quit W.....r" t ting tllb
proqr but don't ..ant to introdue" ... vuln..cability or at l e nOe a bi"
..n... 00 'I....111 ehcck lor tho.e progrllrlll ...ho~ .... l ..etiv.. Ullcr id i~ n .. t th..





1_ ( thi.(eRR.] _ 0 " PID. thb[PID] " PROO _ thi.[PROGI









• Q ~~ PI». thie[PID] " PROG _ thia[PRa;1
thh[ElIID) && RUID _ thi,,[RUID) &~ E:!JID :_ RIIID
TIlls tran~ition is t ...ken wh..n ... proqr............teo a HI.. e ... lling tho crc...t ..
llyn.... call
-,
tr...ns cr t .. lCREATI
<- ..ft _ e"
-,. ... ft .. r_cr t .. '
1_ (thlo[llRJI.) 0&& PID tll1o[PID] && INODE:. thbIOBJ_DroDE)
&& FILE: • thi"IOBJI,
end er..... t ... '
,-
Proqe"",,, c ho cr..... t .. files by c ...lling th .. QPE:rcwc or OPf2l_\fI'C tdl and
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1_ ( thio(l!RR) - 0 " FlO. ellh(FIO] "





1_ ( thia{£JUl) - 0 " PIO • ehi.(PIDI "
:moDE I_ thio(OBJ_WOOI:] l<l< I'lLt. thiG(OBJ],
"nd .h""",
,.
The fOIling tranaitio re talcen ..n"r ....uc.e.... ful exo. if .. fil" i ••ened
lor "xheen.o "l'h the Or ..."eso "aU
.,
tr""" ....e .. CAOCESSl
<- aft"~_",,e.,
- ...l ...._....e ... '






1_ I tllh(l!.JIR] 0 "l< PIO thio(PID] 0" DIODE. thill(OBJ_INtlDE]
" PILE ••hb [OBJ] ,
end ..... ,
tor ""it"for r".d i~ n"" opened
'h"n "" h ..v" .. D~ohl"",
tllh[PIDJ " DIODE !.a" pm
thi.(OBJ) ,
If .he .""'" fHe thae " ... opon"'"
and 'he lnod" nlll>De~ hn "Ilanoed
.,
'rana ..... i.ol (OPENJ\1
<- after_..ccua,
-. viol ..Uon,







L (.Il1.(Ii>Ql.) 0 '" FlO _ .1lt.(PUI] '" DIODE I_ ehi"tOBJ_D100E)
" FI.LE _ ehh (OBJ], I
end ""lte2,
ttana ..... ieoJ IOPI2Ch"l'1
<_ ..fe.. r_..""..... ,
-. "iol.. t10n,
1_ (ehb(ERI\] 0" PID ehia{PIOI l<' !NODI: !. tIl10(OBJ_DroOE]










This pattern can detect the attack by seeing if the inode for the file has changed. How does this happen?
When the file is first opened. it will have an inode given by the destination of the link. If an attacker moves
the original file and creates in its place a link that to points to to another file, this inode will change. Thus.
by detecting this change in inode value. the attack can be detected.
Unfortunately, this pattern cannot be used as is with the Basic Security Module C2logging provided by
Sun with Solaris 2.4. For this pattern to work, the audit trail would need to provide, at least, the following
information:
1. execve: ERROR. EUID, RUID, PID, and program name
2. creat: ERROR, PID, initial file name, final file name, and inode number
3. open: ERROR, PID, initial file name. final filename, and inode number
4. close: ERROR, PID, inode. initial file name, and final file name
5. chown: ERROR, PID, inode, initial file name, and final file name
6. chomod: ERROR, PID, inode, initial file name, and final file name
7. access: ERROR, PID. inode. initial file name, and final file name
8. stat: ERROR, PID, inode, initial file name, and final file name
The only items that require explanation are the file names. Ifwe have a symbolic link syml that points to
a file fill then a call to chmod ( "syml" ,mode) would require an audit trail record that would indicate
that the chmod system call was executed on the initial file name syml and the final file name fill. The
inode should be the one corresponding to the final name.
The audit trail generated by the Basic Security Module provided with Solaris 2.4 violates the file names
requirement. To see why this is important, consider the following fragment of a setuid C program called
xtennbug:
/' C~ute a 109 fUe called "te=buIl.I .... "/
H( crcatl·xte=buIl.I09".Ol > -1 I (
/. Tb" p<lrmidorur. of the cruted tile "er" .... t to OxOOOOO. eh""".. th_
to " ..""'thill.. OIOra r .....eJt<lb1e "I
H( c_I·"t,,=bug.log",S_II<WXUIS_II<WXGls_II<WXOI •• -1 I (
fprlnt£latderr. 'Could net "han.... th" pe=i"don o£ £lIe .te=bull.l"11\n"l:
,
I ehe (
fprilltf (stderr. 'Could nOt "re"te I .... til" xtermbu... IOlI\n·l:
and an attack script that will exploit the vulnerability described in this document is called xtermbug . exploit:
1!/binf"h








This attack can not be detected by the pattern described in this document if you are using the Basic
Security Module logging in Solaris 2.4. The audit trail generated for this session, reformatted for clarity
and brevity. with the attacker called gollum, and the victim called krsul, is:
1 ",,~cveI21 - pll~h./h""",/>;allum/"'~~=hu.g.""Ploi~ _ l!l!JD gollum _ R\IUI <;IOllum
2 ""ecve121 - pa~h,I""~/abin/<Ob'Io<I - WID <;Iollum - IWJ:D <;Iallu:o
1 """"0<1121 - arqum<>n~.2.0"llb~.lIIDde _ 1lrqUIIIIlJ1~.l.a"a,elGV
4 pUll.. / .1l>O~do~/ho.../go11um/"t~=.bug.lD\l• WID <;Iollum • RUID <;Io11um
5 chownl21 - ugumen~.2.0"Hl.new file "'iel - orgwnen~.3.0x341,new file gid
fi pacll. I .....~c1o"'/h_/go11...../"~e=hu.g.lO<;1 - EUTD <;Iollum - RUID >;ol1um
7 e"ecvo(21 _ pIlU'./ho"",,,/k:n,,,lIbin'''tenobug _ £U:ID ku",1 _ RITID lIo11um
e necve(21 - pUh,/",."'/bin/oleep - WID gol1um - RUID <;Io11Ul1l
9 e,,~cveI21 _ pll~h./u8:l[/locB1/bin'mv _ m1D goU..... _ IlUIn gOll=
10 <ename(2) - pUh./.""'rdor/h""",/."ol1"",l"t"r>ribLlg.IOV
11 pll~h. / .lIIOrdo"'/h""",/>;ol1um/junk _ """'D 9011"", _ RITID 9011"",
n el<eev.>(2) - pllth./u.c/bin/ln - EIIID <;Iallum - RUID geUum
Il symlinkl21 - text, /h""""all<rGul/bcuk..o>e - pa~h, I.Il>Orclorlho"",/gol1uml"te=hu.g.lov
14 EIIID gol1Ul1l - RUID <;Io11w::1
15 e>:e=e(2) - path,/",o~/bin/cat - WID gol1Ul1l - RUID goUum
16 crut(21 _ path,I.ll>Orcla",/hOlllOIgollW11/"unobug.1D\l _ anrument,J,O~,ar","p"n: fI ...."
17 = krsul _ RUID gol1l"",
18 c_121 - erlJUlllOn~.2.0"lft.n_ filll IlI<><Ia _ path./hOlllollalkrsullbroaJc-"""
19 = ""aul _ RUID gol1U11l.
20 ,,:<e=e(21 - Plltb.lu... ",/binlc... t - EUID gol1Ul1l _ RUID 9all"",
Notice that in line 20, the audit trail indicates that the chmod (2) system call was made to the file
/homes/krsullbreakJ1le. While this is ultimately true, it does little to help detect the exploitation of the
vulnerability. The pattern design specifically looks for a chmod or chown to the same file name as the
creat but with different inode numbers. The audit trail should mention that the original call was made to
file xtennbug .log.
3.3.2 PATIERN: 3.failed-Iogins
This pattern attempts to detect failed login attempts. Specifically, it looks for more than 3 failed login
attempts in a 3 minute time period. This could indicate that a password attack is occuring against a user
account.
This pattern cannot be tested because IDIOT currently does not support a CLK event. The idea behind
a CLK event is to allow timing infonnation to be incorporated into the pattern. Consider the code for the
pattern:






1_ ( ~hls['I'I:!IE] - t1ll>o!t ~ 160, ]
end elk,
encl Inv,


















~h!'[ElUII • 1 ". ~!d. thia[lIlnDl " thi,,[TIHI!.J - tlmo < 180,
,
end fdU,
The first failed login attempt sets the time attribute of the token. This is taken from the timestamp
information in the audit trail. The third failed login attempt can use this to make a transition if less than 180
seconds (3 minutes) has passed. The CLK event occurs at predicatable time intervals (say every second). It
is used in the invariant to delete any tokens that have been in the state machine for longer than 3 minutes.
The CLK event should to simple to add to IDIOT and would provide great flexibility in writing patterns
to detect failed login, network access and other object creation attempts.
3.3.3 PATTERN: dirJ>rowser
This pattern detects a user browsing through directories. It does this by counting the number of change-
directory events in the audit traiL Normally a user executes a few chdir commands in a session, but an
abnormally high number of lhese commands could indicate someone browsing where they shouldn't be.
This pattern cannot be tested because it uses the CLK event as described in the previous section. However.
it illustrates a useful way of detecting if someone is browsing through sensitive directories. It uses the inode
of a shell process to identify which process to monitor - most users browse using their shell. It then
counts the number of CHDIR (change directory) events in the audit trail. If this count exceeds a threshold,
it triggers the pattern.
3.3.4 PATTERN: Ie
This pattern tests to see if an ethernet device was put into promiscuous mode. In the words of the comments
to the pattern:
I!.otablbhing " b,,~dlink to /dIN/le and op<>J\U1Q' tM 1>,,~dUnl< i." not
pOso!blc be<:;auac h"rd Unka """"ot be eatabliahlO<1 ""~o.,, d""i,,"a. Don't
len"" b"'" to tllat ~or peo..;..tuity Yllt.
This pattern may not be possible to implement at all, but is included as an example.
3.3.5 PATTERN: port_walk
This pattern attempts to detect a port walk attempt. It uses accept events in the audit trail to detect an
intruder connecting to ports across the machine in an attempt to see what services are running. It cannot be
tested or implemented as IDIOT does not support the accept event yet. Ifit were extended to handle such
events, then a wide variety of network attack patterns could be detected. See the section on limitations of
auditing for more information.
3.3.6 PATTERN: dont-follow-sym-Iinks
This pattern attempts to detect a seruid root program following a symbolic link. This a potential vulnerability
as an attacker could replace the link with a link to another file, and subvert the operation of the setuid root
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program.




1_ { th15ll!RRl ·0" thhlEUrDl • 0 ~l" iGll.nJclthislOBJl1 l"lO
PILB • thl.e{OB.JI lOlO pIO • thh(PID], I
end op.m5,
This code detects if a file was opened for reading by a process running with root prvileges. It uses the
islink () call to test whether the file was a link. This is a mistake- the state of the file system may have
changed between when the audit data was generated and the pattern is being run. This is explained in the
section on External declarations in the technical documentation.
This pattern is an example of how not to use external functions to carry out computations. External
functions should never query system state that may change between when the audit trail was generated and
when the pattern is run.
3.3.7 PATIERN: timing-attack
This pattern also uses the CLK event, but to detect a race condition attack where a file is unlinked and
relinked to a new destination before being accessed. This is a classic "time-to-check-to-time-to-use" attack.
The first transition records the time that shell script starts to execute a program pointed to by a link. The
next transition is taken when the same file is unlinked within I second. The final transition is taken if that
same file is relinked to a different location within I millisecond. This triggers the pattern - an attacker is
attempting to relink a setuid link to point at a file he/she wishes to gain access to.
The invariant in this pattern deletes any tokens that have been in the state machine for longer than 5





4.1 The C2..appl Application
Testing a pattern is a straightforward procedure. It involves compiling the pattern, linking the pattern into
a program that can process the pattern and running the pattern with an audit trail. In IDIOT the three steps
are performed llsing the same program: C2_appl.
The patterns can be stored in arbitrary directories. The example shown here assumes that the pattern is
stored in a directory called $IDIOT...HOME/C2_patterns. Note that the descriptions of these patterns
are normally not located in this directory.
To compile a pattern run the C2_appl application and type the command "parse <pattern




lna1d~ Btmt reduced ""Pr, printfl·, .. \n"l
Pulhing atate "aurt_inv" into tb" invariant
Pulhing "tat" "final· into the Invulant
'!'he Stltu in this invariant ar" 2. whicb arll'
Itart_inv
,~,
Parsing invari .....t tranliUen "xit
Parling tr"""itien 1IIOdl1
Iru;ide scmt reduced ""Pr, lllle...e-~£RRll Cg 01 "





->~, 0>0<11., •• "
<- exee
...lolatlon
<- I'IO(\J. _t ....




Inside cteate p ..ttorn.
1n.IItant>at.. d n"" pacu.... i ...... c""".. tOt aocu'dwr~cuutuid
tini>
After compilation of the pattern you should be able to see the c++ and relocatable files produced
in the $lDlDT_HOME directory. The files generated will have the name that was indicated in the
first line of the pattern description. For example, in the following pattern the name given to the pat-
tern is setuidwritessetuid and hence the resultant files will be setuidwri tessetuid. C and
setuidwritessetuid. so.




naco ocort ...ltet_ex"". vie1<>.tien,




1_ ! thio[EllRI ... " PID. tbb[PIDI "PILE. tb1B[DBJ] "
U • .."""ltbh(OBJJ10DS]I • 1 II ieoidlthh(OBJJ<DDS]l • 1),
..nd 1I»dl2,
end oecuidwrite..etuid,
After you have compiled the pattern you must link it to rhe C2_appl program by issuing the "dlink
<pattern name>" command. Note that rhe pattern needs to be compiled only once and can be linked
many rimes in many different runs. In rhe following example the pattern compiled earlier in this section is
linked in a different session.
S cd SIDIOTJlOHE




In.oid.. c ..... t .. p ..tt .......
tln1>
Running the pattern on an audirtrail involves giving the "run <audi t trail file>" command.
The following figure shows an example of running a pattern on a C2 audit trail.
S cd SIDIOTJlOHE
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$ pwd I "hore ..r .. _?
fhO"",,,fgoll,,,,,fIDIOT
$ h -1 /h""",MqollU"'ftr..UG/""itu-eetuLd...udlt_tr..il
_rv_nr 1 ..ollU'" 15496 Dec Z 16,14 tr..il"' .... tuid-....it....-a ..tuld ...udlt_t"..il
$ . /CZ_..pp1
dni. dUnlo; Ih~s/qollWII/IDIOT/a.. tuLdIorrit..nuuid."a
I""id.. cr.. u .. p ..tt..m.
tini. run Ih"""'MqollWll/t"..U .. I ....itu-eetuid...udit_ta..U
5h"",.."dlt: ..ill .."ecute th.. 10110..in\l cOlrlllMld,
t .. il _0 tr..n./.... t"id-....it... - .... tuid ...udit_tt..il I pt..udit _r I
...~id prOllt"'" /h""",'qollUlll/vulller/t...tl cre.. t ..d/open~ fot ....it..
tha " .. tuLd Or ""ecutahl.. fil .. 1.IDDtd<>r/h"""" ..oll"",/taStl.tl .
... t"id prOllt,,", Ih..... /lIollUlll/""lller/t..nZ treat~fopen~ lor ....it..
th.. " .. tuLd or .." ..""tabl.. file f.lDDtdDr/h....../1I01lutlftut2,el .
... tuid prOlltlltl IhOlDOlfllollUlll/vulner/tenZ tre..t~/optn~ fot ....it..
th..... tuLd or .." ..""tahl.. fil .. f.lDDtd<>r/hoa>e/llollutl/tutl.el.
Sh"",..udLt, No of cb:opped ovente • 56
tlnl.
You can tum on debugging on the C2_server that C2_appl application runs by issuing the command
"server debug 1". The following figure illustrates turning on debugging.
S cd SlDIOT.J!ClI<I<
S pwd I wh.. t .... ro " .. ?
Ih""",,,/o .. ll""'/IDIOT
S h -1 /ho.... s/llOUutI/tt.. il./vrite"-.... tuid ...udit_troil
_rv_nr 1 o .. llUlll lS496 D<!t 2 16:34 traLhf.etuid-....ites-.... tu'd, .."dLt_trail
S . fCZ_..ppl
dOl»' dli Iho...... fllOllU"'/IDIOT/ .. etuidlorrit .. u .. tuid.ao
InsLd.. er t .. patt .. rn.
tini. serv..r debug 1
tin,. run Ihomos /lIo11woltr.. il,,'....it....- ..etuid. "Udlt_trail
Sh......."d,t, will ""..cut.. th.. foUowing c<>lrlllllnd,
toil .0 troil./a .. tuld-""ite,,-a .. tuld.oudLt_troil I proudit _t I
FORK, TDlE!817S811761.RUIDl83JI •••.•••• OBJ_INO. 0
CLOSE. TIHl':!817S81177I, RUIDl8331 •••••••• OBJ_INtI • 0
CLOSIl, TIHl':!817S81177I.RUIDl83JI •.•.•••• OBoJ_INtI. 0
.... tuid prOllt"'" Ih""""fgo11"",/vuln..rftutl erened/opened for ....it..
th...... tuid Ot .." ..eutol:>l.. Hle /.lDDtdOt/h""",flloll"""t ... tl.cl.
CLOSE. T:IHIll81'S81l79l.RUIDI&3JI .••.•.•.••.••• OBJ_WO. 4113
CLOSE. TDlEl81'S81179l.P.u:tDI83lJ •• , •••••••.••• OBJ_nlO • 4113
E::'llT, TDlEI81H81l79f.P.UIDIUJf. . •.••••••• I!P.RIOl.RE:t"IOl
Show..udit, No ..1 dropped ""ent•• 56
ti..i.
4.2 Writing IDIOT Patterns
This section will take a step-by-step approach to writing a pattern. Along the way, each element ofa pattern
will be described. This will enable you to read an IDIOT pattern and understand what it is doing, and to
write your own patterns.
As an example, we will use the other_C2_patterns/lpr_copy_files pattern. We will explain
each pan of the pattern as it is developed.
4.2.1 Basic structure of a pattern
A pattern consists of four key components:
1. A name for the pattern - Ipr_copy_f i les in our case. The name is found just after (he pattern
keyword.
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2. A post action which is executed when the pattern is matched.
3. An invariant which specifies when tokens are to be deleted.
4. A set of transitions between states, with associated guard expressions.
Of these, the post action and invariant are optional. A pattern without a post action doesn't make much
sense as it won't be able to report to the outside world. A pattern need not have an invariant if it does not
need to delete tokens.
The general structure for a pattern is as follows:
<ext..rnal <Ieclarati.."".
<tolten colo~ declontlo.u.
In"9 U1variant ~invariant n-.-. /. optionol invar.l""t '/
<:Invod""t atato declaraUon.a>
tcono <t".moIUe" """",>«event.,
~- <tranaiUon from ata... n""",.,
-. <ttanoltLon to atoto """"'"
1_ I <quard e>:prennion>;}
end <tcanoiUon n"""'>;
end ~invariant n"""," J
,. accual pattern tr"""itions ""art here .,
tn.na <t""""ition 1 name'«"""nt>'
~_ ~.ran.tllition from atato n-.->;
-> ~tran.tllidon to ototo na",,»,
1_ I <guard ""Pro""ion>, I
end. <tr"""itlon 1 """"'>;
t"ana <tt"""ition 2 Rhme>l<owent»
~_ <tranoitio" from ntato """"'"
-> <ttan.itlon to .. tOte IUU:I<!>; •
1_ ( <guard e>:pre.aion>:)
end <t.."""ltLon 2 .........>;
end <pottem ~>;
There can be more than one invariant. Each invariant is given a unique name. An invariant is specified
like a real pattern - it can have multiple states.
The external declarations refer to functions that will be used to perfonn computations in the pattern.
They are covered in detail in Section 5.2.
The pattern name follows the pattern keyword. This must agree with the name at the end of the
pattern following the end keyword. This will be the name of the pattern C++ code generated when this
pattern is parsed. So in our case, lpr-copy_files will generate lpr-copy_files.C which will be
compiled to lpr_copy_files. so. Note, the pattern name and the name of the file containing the pattern
do not have to agree. The pattern name is what is used.
4.2.2 State declarations
The state declarations section is where the states of the pattern are listed. This is similar to declaring a
variable - the state keyword specifies that the variable names following it are actually states in the
IDIOT pattern. For example.
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specifies three states - the start state, and two other named states. These names are used in the transition
section to specify what transitions connect what states. Note, the start state does not have to be explicitly
denoted as such - when the transitions are parsed, the start state is deduced.
States can be declared nodup. This means that tokens will not be duplicated when they move from that
state. Typically, a token which satisfies a guard will be duplicated into the state after the guard, leaving a
token behind. A nodup state means that the token moves into the new state, and no token remains in the
source state. The start state cannot be nodup'd. To declare a state nodup do:
4.2.3 Token color declarations
Tokens have bindings associated with them that can carry values along as the token moves through the
machine. For example, in our pattern, we might want to record the user id of the person who executed the
Ipr command and the process id of the command itself. We declare two variables to store these values:
RUID and PlD:
int RlITD. PIg,
These variables can now be used in the guard expressions. Once assigned to, they will store a value that is
bound to that token as it moves through the state machine - consider them as "local variables" to a token.
Each token will have a unique pair of these variables as every execution of the Ipr command will have a
unique PID assigned to it.
How are these variables set and used? We will discuss this when we describe transitions.
4.2.4 The post action
The post action code is executed when the pattern is matched. It is usually used to infonn the system
operator that a potential intrusion has occurred, or it could take active steps to halt the intrusion (such as
shutting down the system). The post action code is nonnal C code, and it can reference any of the local
variables declared in the pattern.
4.2.5 The invariant
Every time a pattern is evaluated, the invariant is also evaluated. This controls the deletion of tokens from
the machine. Why is this necessary? Consider our example pattern again. Every time the Ipr program
is executed, a token will move from the start state to the after_lpr-exec state. But this invocation of
Ipr may be completely innocent. Thus that token will remain in the after-lpr_exec state. Over time,
tokens will accumulate in the machine increasing processing time and causing memory overflow. Thus we
need a mechanism to delete tokens that are no longer necessary.
For every token that is placed in the start state of the main pattern, a token is placed in the start state
of the invariant state machine. Events drive the tokens through both the main pattern and the invariant
pattern. If a token reaches the final state in the invariant state machine. the corresponding token, and all its
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descendents, are deleted from the main pattern state machine. To do this, IDIOT maintains a link between
tokens in the main pattern machine and those in the invariant machine. This deletion happens automatically.
An invariant is specified using the same syntax as a nonnal pattern transition. In our example, there are
only two states to the invariant machine, with one transition between them. The following code shows the
invariant:





1_ (PID· thblPIDI, )
end G>ti~,
Al\<l Ht5t_~nv,
The transition is named exit and it leads from state starLinv to stare final. These states are
declared prior to the transition specification. This transition is taken when an EXIT event occurs in the audit
trail - when a process has exited. The PID attribute is available in this event, and it gives the process id
of the exiting process. Our invariant guard sta[es that any token whose PID color matches the PID attribme
from this event will be deleted. In simple tenns, all tokens created by this process will have the same
PID value. When the same process exits, we will delete all these tokens using this invariant. The guard
expression in the 1_ section will be explained in Section 4.2.7.
This is a very common invariant. A lot of patterns will delete tokens associated with a process once
that process exits. Another common invariant is deleting tokens that no longer can fonn part of an intrusion
attempt. For example, in the other_C2_patterns /3 -failed-logins pattern. the invariant deletes
any tokens that have been in the system for longer than 3 minutes. This pattern looks for 3 failed login
attempts within the space of 3 minutes. so keeping tokens around for any longer is pointless.
n"'l inv"d""t inv




1_ ( thi.. (TDlE] - t1m<>,. laO, ]
end tIl<,
end inv,
The eLK event has not been implemented yet.
·,.2.6 lTnification· binding values to tokens
Before .... ~ : '0 discuss transitions and guards, the concept of unification must be discussed. IDIOT uses
uni~7O:[EI()'" :0 lest guard expressions. An expression is unifiable if the value on the left hand side and that on
the. . 'jI the = sign can be combined. The reader is refered to standard textbooks on this topic: [Set89]
for example. Simply put, an expression of the fonn x = y is unifiable ifx and y both have the same value.
If one of x or y does not have a value bound to it. it assumes the value of the other variable. This allows
assignment to occur, without requiring unique assignment and equality operators.
4.2.7 Pattern transitions
After the invariant comes a list of the transitions. There is no special order to each transition, as IDIOT
computes the placement of the states based on the transition specifications. Each transition is contained
within a trans ... end block.
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A transition is associated with a particular audit event. In our example pattern, the two transitions are
associated with EXECVE and CREAT respectively. A transition will only be taken if its corresponding event
occurs, and its guard is satisfied.
A guard is a boolean expression that must be satisfied before a token can transit a guard. The boolean
expressions in IDIOT are expressed in a C-like syntax. They are evaluated left-to-right with short circuit
evaluation. This means that if a component of the guard causes the whole guard to evaluate to false,
evaluation halts. Most guards are specified in conjunctive normal form - a conjunction of clauses.
Conjunction is specified using the AND operator, which is && in C (and IDIOn.
The guard for the transition exec_lpr looks as follows:
,- ,
~hi~I"""1 • 0 .... PID. ~hbIPIDI " PIlOCi. ~hi~(PIlOGJ ....
1l00D • thisIRUID] "
Ist"""'tth(·.·lp~·. this[PROG]l • II .... thi~II!llID] .0,
This guard is composed of six clauses each separated by a && operator. The full guard is only true if each
of the clauses are individually true. If any clause evaluates to false, the value of the conjunction of these
clauses is false, so evaluation halts and the guard evaluates to false.
The first clause checks the ERR attribute of the event. This is a very common test, and can be seen
in just about every guard. If ERR is 0 the event occurred successfully, if it is 1 the event failed for some
reason. So if we had this [ERR) = 1 in the clause, we would be testing for failed EXECVE events. In
the clause, this refers to the attributes of the current event.
The second clause extracts the PID attribute from the audit record, and binds it to the current token.
This now becomes a local variable available to all other guards in other transitions. Effectively, we have
tagged this token with the process id of the process that caused the token to enter the state machine.
The third clause does the same but for the name of the program which is stored in the PROG attribute of
the EXECVE event. This is the full pathname of the executable associate with this event. Again, we bind
this to a token color (i.e. a local variable to the token) called PROG.
Similarly, the fourth clause extracts the real user id of the process that caused with audit event and binds
it to the token color RUID. This will be used later in the post action to identify which user attempted to copy
over a file. This is a common occurrence in patterns - some identification infonnation is extracted from the
events and bound to a token color. This information is usually process id, user id or file name information.
This can be used to pinpoint who attempted an intrusion, and what they were using or trying to access.
These bindings are actually used in the second transition. The guard for the second transition looks as
follows:
,- ,
~hi.IElUlJ ·0 .... thh[PID] • PID~" FILl'. tllh(OBJ] ....
l!nTre"(··/v~r/~poo!l·. ~hi,,(OB.T)) • 0),
The == operator is not used in IDIOT. Instead, the = operator is used to unify the values on the left and
right of the operator.
Notice how the order of the terms around the =sign is reversed. We are now unifying in the opposite
direction. Each clause will evaluate to true if the value of the specified attribute from this audit event
matches the corresponding color for the token. IDIOT will match the PID attribute for this event with the
PID color for every token in the after_lpr_exec state. This color was bound in the first transition.
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This enables us to tie audit records together that belong to the same process. If another process called
the creat () system call, there would be a CREAT event in the audit trail- but the PID field would not
match the token's PID field. Only the process that first introduced the token into the state machine will
match the PID field.
We then bind the file name in the OBJ attribute of the event to the token color FILE. This is used in the




5.1 How IDIOT works
As with most sizable projects, IDIOT consists of a fairly complex file structure. Determining how the
components of the program integrate and work together can be a challenging task. This section is presented
as an overview of the structure of IDIOT, discussing its major components and how they cooperate to form
an intrusion detection system.
IDIOT consists primarily of four components: the audit trail, showaudi t. pl. the CZ...server, and the
pattern descriptions. Of these four. both the audit trail and showaudi t . pl are machine dependent, while
the CZ..5erver and patterns are portable. A fifth component. C2...appl, provides an interactive user interface
to IDIOT; this is also portable.
5.1.1 Audit Trail
While technically quite separate from IDIOT, the audit trail is obviously an extremely important part of
this intrusion detection system. Without an audit trail, there would be no record of activities against which
patterns could be matched, and this system would be rather useless. Currently IDIOT has only been used
with Solaris 2.4 and the Sun BSM audit trail. However, the system design should work equally well with
virtually any other OS and audit trail. Difficulties arise from the fact that, while most operating systems
provide some manner of audit trail, they each have a different format. This leads to portability problems.
IDIOT deals with this problem by working with a canonical form of the audit trail, rather than the raw audit
trail itself.
5.1.2 showaudi t . pl
showaudi t .pl is IDIOT's solution to handling different audit trail fonnats. The current showaudi t . pI
is simply a PERL script that converts a Sun BSM audit trail into the canonical fonnat necessary for IDIOT.
If IDIOT is moved onto a new platform, only showaudi t .pl need be rewritten to accomodate the new
audit trail format. Similarly, jf IDIOT were to be expanded on an existing system to examine more detailed
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infonnation from the audit trail, showaudi t . pI would need to be extended to include the new infonnation
in the canonical audit trail.
showaudi t .pI accepts either raw binary input files or ASCII files generated using the praudi t
command. It can be run from the C2_appl interpreter (discussed later) to parse audit files, or it can be run
manually to view an audit trail in canonical form. By utilizing command~line options, the audit trail can be
printed either with or without symbolic names for events.
As the inner workings of showaudi t .pl are discussed in Section 5.3, we will not go into any more
detail here.
5.1.3 C2-Server
The CZ..5erver is the core of IDIOT. It is actually a C++ class, an instance of which is instantiated to
perfonn the intrusion detection. An object of type CZ..5erver has several methods associated with it; the
most interesting of those are listed here:
int rUILpraudit (char *audiLfiIe) - primary method, described below
C2..Pattern *parse_file (char *patternfiIe) -parse an IDIOT pattern file
C2_Pattern *dIlink_file(char *fiIe) - dynamically link a compiled pattern description
into the server object
As shown above, run_praudi t () simply takes the name of the audit file as input. rUILpraudi t ( )
calls showaudi t .pl to transfonn the audit trail information into canonical form. Then it goes into a loop,
reading one audit event at a time from the trans fanned audit file. If run against a static audit trail. this loop
continues until it reaches end-of-file. Otherwise, run_praudi t only exits upon encountering some kind
of failure.
For each event, run..praudi t () steps through the list of patterns which are requesting events. For
each of these patterns, it executes the method PatProc (), passing the current event as a parameter.
PatProc () is a method for each pattern, and thus knows the current state of matching for that pattern.
It takes the current event and perfonns the operations that should result from the occurrence of that event.
These include operations such as token unification and transition firing.
5.1.4 I'allerns
Finally, of course, the patterns playa major role in the workings of IDIOT. Patterns are written in a language
that describes a known method of attack as a set of states and transitions between them. As indicated above,
transitions are based on audit trail records, or events.
To be used by IDIOT, patterns must translated into C++, compiled into shared objects, and linked
into the C2_Server object. This can all be done at startup time, or patterns may be added to the server
dynamically.









Figure 5.1: Structure of IDIOT
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5.1.5 CZ-"ppl
C2_appl provides an interactive interface into IDIOT. It allows the user to compile patterns, dynamically
link pattern objects and instantiate server objects. as well as several other related activhies. Listed below
are some of the major commands available:
parse - parse a pattern file
dlink - dynamically link a compiled pattern into the server
server - perform operations on the server (set inlile to binary or ascii, exercise patterns, change debug
leve!, or print the server queue)
debug - debug a pattern description
run - initiates run_praudi t, described above
time - display time accumulated in C2....appl
5.2 Refering to external functions
External utility functions are used to compute results that cannot be expressed in IDIOT pattern form. For
example, the pattern Ipd...delete_files checks to see if a file is being deleted outside of a specific
directory tree. A function called inTree will check to see ifa given filename is below a specified directory
point. It returns TRUE if this is so.
How can this be incorporated into an IDIOT pattern? The following example shows how:
e"tem int in'l'ree I~tr. ~tr);
p~tt..m Ip<Ldelete3ile. 'lpd delete. filn not u<"ldc!r .pool dlr" priority 1
~c.. c .. acarc. dcu_IP'!...""'"c. ~ft..r_d..ht.. ,
.tr PROG. PILE,
L<
cbhlEllR) .0 .... cbiarPID) • PID .... PILE. cbis\OB.:J) ....
Cin'l'ru! ·/uau.pool". FILE) • 0];
The function inTree is declared external to the pattern. The declaration states that it takes two string
arguments, and returns an integer. When the function is used, we pass two string arguments: /usr / spool
and the token attribute FILE.
The extern keyword behaves similarly to C, but there are slight differences. The external declaration
is parsed by IDIOT to see if it matches an internal type. If we examine the actual declaration for inTree,
we see it takes two strings as arguments, which is declared in utili ties" Cas:
int inTree(char *dir, char *filel i
However, this will cause an error in IDIOT. Instead, the built in string type is used: str. IDIOT will
parse this and emit C++ code as follows:
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extern int inTree(Str , Str );
This uses the inbuilt string class which is then translated into a RWCString.
The allowable parameter types for external declarations are as follows:
I. int Integer type - equivalent to C into
2. bool Boolean type - equivalent to C into
3. s tr String type - equivalent to C char *.
NOTE it is imponant that any external C function be used to compute data that will not change over
time! For example, if an external function was written which computed the number of users on the system,
an IDIOT pattern which was parsing an audit trail and called that function would probably get a different
result every time it was run.
This problem occurs because IDIOT patterns get all their information about the system from the audit
trail. If an external function computes a value that changes over time (such as number ofprocesses, average
system load, disk utilization) then the values being returned by the external function are not what they would
have been at the time the audit trail was generated. Instead, they will reflect the system state when the
pattern is run, which may be completely different from the state when the audit file was generated.
For example, see the pattern other_C2_patterns/dont-follow-syrn-links. This pattern
uses a function islink () to see whether a specified file is a symbolic link. However, the state of the file
system may have changed between the time when the audit data was generated and the time the pattern is
run.
In all the patterns provided with IDIOT, the utility functions perform computations that cannot be easily
done in a pattern specification. For example, a pattern can check to see if a file name exists in a specified
path component (this is a string match - it does not check the state of the file system). Or it can see if a file
permission mask has the execute bit set (a simple bit-wise computation).
5.3 Audit trail canonicalization
A problem faced by any intrusion detection system is portability - every vendor and system has its own
unique audit trail format. Indeed, this format often changes across OS families from the same vendor
(SunOS vs. Solaris, for example). A well designed intrusion detection system should be able to accomadate
multiple audit trail formats with little modification.
5,3.1 The role of showaudit. pI
IDIOT achieves this platform independence by spliting the intrusion detection engine into two parts: a
front end tool that reads a system-dependent audit trail and generates a platform independent intermediate
form and a back end that performs the pattern matching. The showaudit .pl script is a PERL [WS92]
script that converts a Sun BSM audit trail [Sun] into a canonical audit fonnat that IDIOT can handle. The
back end pattern matching engine will take this canonical form and run the patterns against it. If the IDIOT
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system is ported to a new system with a different audit trail format, only the showaudi t. pI script has to
be rewritlen. Similarly, if IDIOT is expanded on an existing system to monitor more detailed information
from the audit trail, the showaudit. pI script has to be extended to include this new information in the
canonical audit trail.
The showaudi t. pI script can accept either raw binary input files or ASCII files generated using the
praudit command. Typically, showaudi t is run from the C2_appl interpreter to parse audit files when
running IDIOT patterns. However, it can also be run manually to view an audit file in canonical form. The
script will run the praudit script to preprocess the audit trail. If the -r option is given, the audit trail is
printed in raw format - no symbolic names for evenrs are printed. The praudi t command runs faster in
raw mode. By default, the script prints symbolic names for events.
As an example, the output when the script ismn with the audit trail forwriting-to-executable-files
IS:
uecve 'l'Ile Peb 20 18:5J:H 19~6 meroobie "",rosbie merosbLe "",rosbie -2
o 20005 h.ilure' No such HI.. or directory _1 • ARRAYIOxfd5641 0
uecve 'Ne peb 20 18:53:30 19~6 "",ro.bie ....rosbie ....rosbie ""'rosbie -2
o 200B5 f"ilur", No .urh fil" or d..ir...,tory _1 • AlUlAYIO"fd5~41 0
cxecve The Feb 20 18:53:34 19~6 IIICrosbie IIICrosbie mcrosbie "",rosbie _2
.. 200B5 llUtten 0 - ARRAYIO"fd5J41 191080
npen - read merosbi.. mcrosbi.. mcrosbi.. mero.bi.. _2 .. 20085 sueeeu 4
_ ARAAYlO:rfd54el n30B5
v:.it The Peb ~O 18:53:34 1996 o:cro.bl.. merosbJ. .. "",ro.b, .. mcro.b,.. -2 0
20005 Sueee"" 0
fork rue Feb 2" 18:53:11 1996 roo.. root root root _2 0 10116 ."eees. 0
As can be seen, the script prints a symbolic name for evenrs - for example, execve is the execve ( )
system call used to overlay a process with an executable image. Parameters to the system call are displayed
after each event name. Identification infonnation for the user calling the command is also printed. In this
case, the user id, effective user id, group id and effective group id is prinred. This is described in more detail
in the Sun BSM audit trail documentation. In contrast, the raw output from showaudit. pI -r looks as
follows (for the same audit trail):
23 B2U60414 127 727 727 727 -2 0 200BS 2 -1 _
/ .eel;or-2fp19/JI;11R6f5unl-GOll5/exploit 0
23 B24860414 727 127 721 127 -2 0 200B5 2 -1 •
/.eetor-2/p17/hotj"v,,-1.0,,1/erploit 0
23 B24850414 121 727 721 727 -2 0 20005 0 0 •
Iho"",/mcrombie/l6YIDlar/""dit_dar"/'O>l;Iloit 19JOaO
00 B24860414 721 721 121 721 -2 0 20085 0 4 •
IbO""'''mcrolbJ.e/'''YIDlOT/llUd..il;_dar'''"",eeu~lI!>l.. 127 0100711 191065
1 8:1860414 727 127 727 727 -2 0 20065 0 " •
2 8:1850Ulo 00 0 _::I. 0 101160 O.
The same infonnation is encoded in the raw fonnat as the ASCII fonnat, but the symbolic names are
replaced by their corresponding integer codes from the audit trail. For example, the last line shows a user
and group id line of 0 0 0 0 which corresponds to the root user and group id.
5.3.2 Operation of showaudi t . pI
The script takes three command line arguments: -i controls what type of audit file fonnat showaudit
expects. -i ascii processes ASCII audit trails and -i binary processes binary audit trails. -f makes
it follow the audit trail as it is generated.
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The script starts by opening a pipe to a command to parse the raw, kernel generated audit file. This is
usually a tail -f of the outputofpraudi t run on the command-line supplied audit filename. The audit
file is then parsed record by record by the showaudi t script and each record is printed in canonical form
to stdout. When showaudi t is used from within C2_appl, this output is redirected into the C2_Server
to drive the IDIOT patterns.
An audit trail is composed of a series of records each of which is a sequence of tokens. Figure 5.2
shows a typical audit record layout. These tokens contain information such as the time the audit record was
generated, the event it represents and user IDs associated with the audit event. Before the actual event token
is decoded, the surrounding header and informational tokens must be decoded. showaudi t processes







Figure 5.2: Layout of a typical audit record
"The script must handle binary and ASCII input formats so the $opt-r flag is checked while parsing
audit record tokens. If the flag is true, the numeric value associated with an event is tested, of not, an ASCII
string can be tested. For example, the file token gives the pathname to the next audit file. It's numeric event
number is 17, and its ASCII string representation is "file". The code to determine whether the current record
is a file record looks as follows:
If ll$op"_,, ~~ $w[OI ··17) II l!$oP".-"~" LIO] ell 'Hl,,')) lfi1<l
ueUer. (~" 171 I
my (Sn".t31le..P4t, Sent. QHlu. $n"""_Budit..-lUe. $dirn-.-I,
HlQ_ < 4 II S_[Jl 1- 1."1199S\d+)\ .. ·1) I
prin" ·No of drOPP<ld event~ • Sdropped_evenu". "In",
exi" 0,
showaudi t handles the following types of audit tokens:
File token - a file token indicates that the current audit trail has ended and it points to where the next
audit file can be found. showaudi t will parse this token and extract the file name for the new audit
file and make three attempts 10 open the new audit file. If it cannot open it after 3 attempts, it gives up
and exits. Furthermore, a file token must mark the start of a new audit file - if showaudi t does
not find a file token, it complains that the audit file is invalid and gives up.
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Header token - a header token marks the begining of an audit record. A corresponding trailer token
marks the end of the audit record. The header token encodes the length of the audit record, the event
type the record encodes and a timestamp for when the audit record was generated. showaudi t
extracts the type of the audit event and the timestamp from the header token. It then starts to pame
the remaining tokens in the audit record.
Path token -a path token contains access path information for an object (typically a file). The pathname
is encoded as a length field and an arbitrary length character string. showaudi t stores the pathname
component. There can be multiple path tokens if a link is being followed,
Attribute token - an attribute token contains information from the file's i-node entry. This includes the
user and group id of the file's owner, the file system the file resides on, the inode for the file and the
device id for the file system device, showaudi t extracts this information.
Argument token - an argument mken comains system call argument information. showaudi t extracts
the argument values. Note, there can be multiple argument tokens - one for each argument to a
system call.
Subject token - a subject token describes a subject (i.e. a process). The fields of interest to showaudi t
are the real and effective user and group id's, the process id of the process thm generated the audit
event, and an audit session id.
Socket token - this records information about a an Internet socket. showaudi t extracts the type, local
port and address and remote port and address information from the token.
Return token - this stores the' return value of a system call and the returned error code for the system
call (the errno value in UNIX). showaudi t extracts both these fields.
Text token - this contains an artibrary text string which is extracted.
Once the header and informational tokens have been processed, showaudit has enough information
to start generating a canonical fonn for the audit record. It calls the prinLC2...record routine to print
out the audit record in canonical form. This routine does not handle every audit event - a variable
dropped...events records how many events were ignored from the audit trail. For each audit event type,
it calls print..base_C2...record to print the basic information about the audit record. This routine prints
the user and group id's, audit session id, process id and the return value and error number from the system
call.
Then the print_C2...record prints information about cenain audit events. This uses the information
stored while parsing the tokens. For example, the code to print a chmod () event looks as follows:
C2_10,
print_b.,.u_C2..rftCo~dl),
1._ hu 3 ugs, PAth. Jnadc ~ the n~ on the filft, U1 type 0"",.
$ftrql·pftth·l • 1·"·1 H ! e:lI:in~ Sft~ql·pftth·},
pri"t· ., $u<;Il·puh·IIO!,
i£ le"bu $ftrql·obj·j)
I p~l"t ••• $Brgol·obj'}{·i.Iladc·}, j
ehft




The C2_10 is the branch of the case statement that handles this audit record type. The path and inode
information was stored earlier in the associative array arg when the tokens were being parsed. These fields
are now accessed and printed out, separated by spaces.
5.4 Adding new audit events to IDIOT
IDIOT does not handle all audit events in the Sun BSM trail. It is possible to enhance IDIOT to extract
information about audit events and provide extra information to patterns. Before attempting to modify
IDIOT to add new events you should read all the documentation shipped with IDIOT and (for Solaris
machines) the Audit Record Description section of the BSM answerbook.
There are three components of the IDIOT system that must be modified to handle a new audit record. 1)
The showaudi t .pl script must parse the audit trail and extract the relevant information out of the audit
record tokens; 2) The C2_Server module must know how to interpret the data and generate the correct
class; 3) The C2_Server: :parse method defined in pat. y must add the event names to the parsing
symbol table.
To add a new event (or add attributes to an existing event) edit the showaudit .pl file and remove
the event you are going to add from the dropped events list (if it's there) and add the event to the appropriate
group. Events are grouped together according to the information they print. All events print the base
record. Groups of events print additional information. The event number can be extracted from the
/ etc/securi ty / audi Levent file. For example, the link system call is event number 5. The entry
in the audit~event file for link is:
Then edit the C2_events . h file and add the code for your event (or the attribute you added). As in
showaudi t. pl. events are grouped into classes of similar events. A GENERIC event in this lile is only
a class definition that encompasses many events. For example, the class "C2Event_GENERIC_EXEC"
represents all execute events that have the same format. The individual instances are defined by the lines:
~ypede! C2E:ven~_GENERIC_EXEr C2Even~_=,
typedot C21:Ven~_GI:UElIIC_EXEC C2Evtln~..EX£CVE,
Similarly, the class "C2EvenLGENERIC" represents all the audit events that share the same format

















we gather that the events CLOSE, ACCESS, CHOIR, FORK. LSTAT, STAT, UNLINK, and VFORK
have been grouped together by the showaudit. pl.




~tatic int p ....htd.-""""t_d~c1s • 0,




aymta!>, pU5bhvelf I ,
~ymtOlb.pu~hln_ ~YlI'...tOlb_"ntryl"I\CC£S5·. -1. "ymtyp_~vent. "yWltu---"on~. NULLl)
~tab.""shlneoraYllLtOlb_entryl"CHIIOD"" -1. 5ymtl'P_event, 5Yl"'1ttr..none, NULLl)
(' Lot. of lin"a d"I..~od ..... O{
~ymtab.pushCn_ "Y'lLtOlb_entryl"S'il'ILDlK", -1. Gymtl'P_event, ~YI""'ttr..nof\O, NULLl)
.Y"'tab.pu.bl.......YllLtOlb_entryl"vFOllX'. _I" ~YI"'I'P_.v~nt. ~ya>Bt.r--"on~. mlLLl)
pu~hed.-ll'V~n,,-d~cb • 1,
{' So"", OIOr" code del"ted '{
Add another line to this routine to push the name of the event you are defining.
5.4.1 Events Supported in Shipped Version
The following tables have a list of the events that can be used in IDIOT patterns with the system as shipped.
Events: EXEC, EXECVE
AUributes: TIME (time..t), RUID (uid..t), EUID (uid..t), RGID (uid.l),
EGID (uid.l). AUlD (uidJ). SID (uid..t). PID (int),
ERR (int), RETVAL (int). PROG (canst char *), PROG....INODE (int).
OBI.MODS (int)
Description: TIME: Time the event took place
RUlD: Real user ill
EUID: Effective user ID
RGID: Real group In
EGID: Effective group ID
AUlD: User audit ID
SID: Session ill
, PID: Process ill
, ERR: Return status of system call
RETVAL: Process return value
PROG: Name of program executed
PROG....INODE: Program inode number
OBI.MODS: Permissions of program executed
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Events: LINK, SYMUNK
Attributes: TIME (time.l), RUID (uid.l), EUID (uid.t), RGID (uid.t),
EGID (uid_t), AUlD (uid.l), SID (uid..1), PID (int),
ERR (int), RETVAL (int), OLDPATH (const char *),
NEWPATIi (const char *)
Description: TIME: TIme the event took place
RUID: Real user ID
EmD: Effective user ID
RGID: Real group ID
EGID: Effective group ID
AmO: User audit ID
SID: Session ID
PIO: Process ill
ERR: Return status of system call
RETVAL: Process return value
OLDPATH: Pathname of the object linking to
NE\VPATH: Palhname of new object
Events: MKNOD
Attributes: TIME (time_t), RUID (uid..l), EUID (uid.l), RGID (uid.l),
EGID (uid..1), AUlD (uid.l), SID (uid.l), PID (int),
ERR (int), RETVAL (inl), OBI (canst char *), DEY..MODE (int)
Description: TIME: Time the event look place
RUID: Real user ID
EUID: Effective user ID
RGID: Real group ID
EGID: Effective group ID
AUlD: User audit ID
SID: Session ID
Pill: Process ID
ERR: Return status of system call
RETVAL: Process return value
OBI: Name of special file
DEYMODE: Permissions of the special file
Events: LOGIN, SU, EXIT
Amibutes: TIME (time_t), RUID (uid.l), EUID (uid.t), RGID (uid.l),
EGID (uid.l), AUlD (uid.l), SID (uid.t), PIO (int),
ERR (int), RE1VAL (int)
Descriplion: TIME: Time the event took place
RUID: Real user ID
EUlD: Effective user ill
RGID: Real group ID
EGID: Effective group ill
AUlD: User audit 10
SID: Session ill
PID: Process ID
ERR Return status of system call
REIVAL: Process return value
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Events: OPEN...R. OPEN...RC, OPEN..R.T, OPEN.RTC, OPEN...RW,
OPEN...RWC, OPEN...RWT, OPEN...RWTC, OPEN_W, OPEN_WC.
OPEN_WT. OPEN_WTC
Attributes: TIME (lime..t), RUID (uid.l), EUID (uid.l), RGID (uid.t).
EGID (uid.l), AUlD (uid..t), SID (uid..t), PID (int).
ERR (int), RErVAL (int), OBl (const char *), OBl.lNODE (int),
OBJ.MODS (int), OBLOWNER (int)
Descriplion: TIME: Time the event took place
RUID: Real user ID
EUID: Effective user ID
RGID: Real group ID
EGID: Effective group ID
AUlD: User audit ID
SID: Session ID
PID: Process ID
ERR: Return status of system call
RETVAL: Process return value
OBl: Name of file being opened
OBl.lNODE: Inode number of file opened
OBJ..MODS: Permissions on file opened
OBJ_OWNER: User ill of file owner
Events: ACCESS. CHDIR, CLOSE, FORK, LSTAT. STAT,
UNLINK. VFORK
Attributes: TIME (time.l). RUID (uid.l), EUID (uid.l), RGID (uid.l).
EGID (uid_t), AUlD (uid_t), SID (uid.!), PID (int),
ERR (int), RETVAL (int), OBl (canst char *), OBl.lNODE (int)
Description: TIME: Time the event took place
RUID: Real user ill
EUID: Effective user ill
ROID: Real group ID
EOID: Effective group ID
AUlD: User audit ID
SID: Session ill
PID: Process ID
ERR: Return status of system call
RETVAL: Process return value
OBl: Name of file being opened
OBl.lNODE: Inode number of file opened
OBl..MODS: Permissions on file opened
OBl_OWNER: User ill of file owner
OBI: Name of object
OBl.lNODE: Inode of object
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Events: CREAT
AnribUles: TIME (time..t), RUID (uid.1), EUlD (uidJ:), RGID (uidJ:),
EGID (uidJ:), AUlD (uid.!), SID (uid..t), PID (int),
ERR (int), RE1VAL (im), OBI (const char *), OBIJNODE (inl),
OBI...MODS (int)
Description: TIME: TIme the event took place
RInD: Real userID
EUID: Effective user ID
RGID: Real group ID
EGID: Effective group ID
AUlD: User audit ID
SID; Session ill
PID: Process ID
ERR: Return status of system call
RETVAL: Process return value
OBI: Name of file being opened
OBI.1NODE: Inode number of file opened
OBJ...M:ODS: Permissions on file opened
OBI~OWNER:User ID of file owner
OBI: Name of file created
OBJ..mODE: Inode of file created
OBI...MODS: Permissions of file created
Events: CHMOD
AUributes: TIME (lime.1), RUID (uid.t), EUID (uid.t), RGID (uid.!),
EGID (uid_t), AUlD (uid.1), SID (uidJ:), Pill (int),
ERR (int), RETVAL (inl), OBJ (const char *), OBI..INODE (inl),
NEW...MODS (inl)
Description: TIME: TIme the event took place
RUID: Real user ill
EUID: Effective user ill
RGill: Real group ID
EGID: Effective group ID
AUlD: User audit ID
SID: Session ID
Pill: Process ill
ERR: Return status of system call
RETVAL: Process return value
OBI: Name of file being opened
OBJ..INODE: Inode number of file opened
OBJ...M:ODS; Permissions on file opened
OBI_OWNER: User ID of file owner
OBI: Name of file for which the permissions are being changed
OBJ..INODE: Inode of file being changed
NEW...MODS: New permissions for file
53
EvenlS: CHOWN
Attributes: TIME (time.1), RUID (uid.1), EUID (uid.1), RGID (uid.1),
EGID (uid.1), AUlD (uid.1), SID (uid.l), PIO (im),
ERR (int), RETVAL (int), OBI (canst char *), OBI..lNODE (int),
OBJ...NEWillD (int), OBLNEWGID (int)
Description: TIME: TIme lhe evenl took place
RUID: Real user ID
EUlD: Effective user ID
RGID: Real group ID
EGID: Effective group ID
AUlD: User audit ID
SID: Session ID
PIO: Process ID
ERR: Return status of system call
REIVAL: Process return value
OBI: Name of file being opened
OBIJNODE: Inode number of file opened
OBI..MODS: Permissions on file opened
OBLOWNER: User ID of file owner
OBI: Name of file for which the ownership is being changed
OBIJNODE: Inode of file being changed
OBI...NEWUID: New user id for file
OBI...NEWGID: New group id for file
5.5 A sample IDIOT program
jig. C was written as an example of how to run IDIOT non-interactively. It instantiates a CZ....server object,
sets the desired debug level, loads the specified patterns, and attempts to match all patterns against the
specified audit trail.
Following is the usage summary for j ig . C:
lJUgo, jig lop~ional .auc:Ut£ilo~ q>a.tto.....Ul"~+\n
Option~ :
_d n -- Sot debug 1"",,1 to n ldefeult~ to g ~f Opt.o" not Oi..." ....
-1 -- Unit i.n pe""oq>iled patt"rn~ lpattu"," p"t~td by default I
- Pattern lUes On c(lllmoUl(! lin" ohoul,d be '.'0 "".nona
As can be seen. the current defaults are to generale no debugging information and to parse all pauems.
For most cases, it would likely be preferable to have j ig . C link precompiled patterns by default. This
would be a minor change within the code.
It should be noted that jig. C was written as an example program and assumes some degree of
experience on the part of the user. No error-checking is performed on the command-line arguments; they
are assumed to be accurate and complete.
5.6 Debugging
The original debugging options for IDIOT were quite simple: debugging was either on or off, and the
only debugging information that could be automatically generated came from the server. Pattern debugging
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information had to be manually inserted into the pattern itself. We decided that more flexibility would be
helpful. There are now three levels of debugging:
Level 1 - Only generate server debugging information
Level 2 - Only generate pattern debugging information
Level 3 - Generate both pattern and server information
We also decided that the ability to separate the pattern debugging information from the server debugging
information would be quite useful. A PERL script, view_debug .pl, was developed for this purpose~ it
is also described below.
5.6.1 Debugging the server
Debugging within the C2_Server is fairly basic. If the debug level is appropriately set, the server generates
information about each audit event it processes. This information includes the type of event, time of
occurrence, RUID, EUID, PID, return value, and various event-dependent information, such as program
name. This information is now only generated when the debug level is set at I or 3. Also, each line of
debug output has been prepended with a %5 to distinguish it from pattern debugging information_
5.6.2 Debugging pallerns
This section describes how to debug patterns written in the IDIOT pattern language. As the language is
especially tailored to specifying pattern transitions, it is difficult to use regular tools such as gdb to debug
patterns. To aid debugging, we have provided some rudimentary output routines. The main utility routine
we have provided is true_print ( ), which takes a string as a parameter, prints the string to STDOUT,
and returns TRUE.
As mentioned above, debugging information for patterns originally had to be generated manually.
We decided that having some debugging information generated automatically could be useful, if it were
governed by the debug level. To achieve this goal, we modified pa t . Y to insert the following code into
every pattern as it is parsed and translated to C++:
int dbull:
e"tern int trut...printCStr J'
dbI.lll • S->debull' /I ""tented within paUern cc""tructcr
if Idb\lll > 11
true...print I' '<pattern n""",' -- <tr/lJU;ition n"""" tr4J\Sition Hred" I;
We decided to only insert calls to true_print () at the completion ofeach transition to allow the user to
maintain a fine grain of control over debugging output.
If more debugging information is desired, there are a couple of options. Note that IDIOT uses short-
circuit evaluation of guards, so if anyone of the conjunctive clauses is false, then evaluation of the whole
clause stops and the transition is not taken_ Thus, if a true_print () call is placed within a clause, all
the preceding clauses must be true before the print will occur. true_print () itself returns TRUE, which
is the identity element for logical-and and has no effect on the evaluation.
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Forexample, ifwe were interested only in theoccurranceofan OPEN_W evem(from thewri ting-to-executabl




1_ { truOJlrU'.tl·tIbtchad OPl!N_'" "vont ... ·1 '" , evont ae"u=od .(
thio[ERnI .0" /. it thio Opo>r"dan outeeeded .,
PIp. thio[PID] " ,. and. tid.. PID _tehos that af tb.. oxec .,
PILE. thb(OIl.JI ...... ,. remember thb HI"",,",,, .,
IO""~tlth1o[OIl.JJlODS]l;,. it this Hlo 10 oxocutablo .,
ond II'IO<lB;
Note that this call to true_print () would always be executed, regardless of the debug level. If the




1_ [ l l<!bug. 11 ? tru".JIrinti·tIbtehod OPI2iJ/ ev..nt ... ·1 : 11 " ,. ""ent occurred"
tlllo[EP.R] .0" ,. it tllb operatian ..uceeeded .(
pm • thia(pm] "" ,. and this PIt> ""'teh..o that of tha ""oc .(
PILE. thb[OBJ) '" ,. r~r tlli" HI..n ..... "
is""..elthio[OBJ..J!ODS]l;
.. nd _8;
As with an ordinary call to true_print ( ) , this would leave the value of the guard unchanged. In addition,
the debugging information would only be generated if the debug level was set appropriately (> I).
One item to note is that each string passed to true_print () is prepended with %P before being
printed, distinguishing it from the server debugging infonnation.
5.7 Interactive debugging
The C2_appl program can be used to run IDIOT interactively. This can sometimes be useful for debugging
purposes. The debug level is initialized to O. To change the debug level, issue the following command:
server debug <debug level>
The specified debug level will cause the appropriate debugging information to be printed to SmOOT.
We mentioned above that each pattern's dbug variable is initialized only once, within the pattern
constructor. Thus, the dbug variable retains the value of the server debug level at the time the pattern was
instantiated. This allows the user to dictate which patterns generate debugging information.
For example, if you only wished to debug the executing-particular-pgms pattern while
matching several, you would do the following:
~ .'C2_oppl IfOtOrt C2_0ppl. debug_level lIet til 0
tini~ dHnk <pe.ttornI.~a.
tini~ dlinl< <p8tt~"".'II~
(/link in Ii p<lttOrn5 without d ..bug info
tIn» d11nk <pottornN.so.
tin» ss"""r d ..bug 2
tin» dUnk 0l<.JlrtJl'lrOl5.so
dni> run <oudit trail~
All of the included patterns would be utilized, but only the executing-particular-pgms pattern
would generate debugging infonnation.
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5.8 Viewing debug information
As an aid in viewing and understanding debugging information, we developed view_debug .pI. This
PERL script separates pattern debugging information from server debugging infonnation. Funherrnore, it
allows both sets of output to be viewed simultaneously with the debugging statements synchronized.
To run it simply type ./view_debug .pl, followed by the command line you wish to have passed to
jig. view_debug. pI will execute ./j ig with the specified command line and separate the debugging
output into the files pat-debug. out (pattern debug information) and C2_debug. out (server debug
information). (NOTE: view_debug. pI currently assumes it is in the same directory as jig.) The output
is separated according to the presence of the O/OP at the beginning of pattern debugging output and the %S
preceding server debugging output. For each line of output the following occurs:
- if preceded by %P, the line is numbered and written to paLdebug.out, minus the %P, and a blank line
(numbered identically) is written to C2_debug.out
- if preceded by %S. the line is numbered and written to C2-debug.out. minus the %S. and a blank line
(numbered identically) is written to pat-debug.ollt
- all other lines are simply printed to STDOUT, without affecting the numbering
Afterview_debug. pI hac; fi~ished. pat_debug. out and C2_debug. out may be viewed side by
side, allowing the user to see exactly what sequence of events is causing each transition to fire. The line
numbers allow easy synchronization while viewing the files.
NOTE: While view_debug. pI will not currently work with the C2..appl interface, this could be
changed with a fairly simple alteration of the PERL code.
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Chapter 6
Limitations of C2 Audit Trails
6.1 Auditing socket calls on System V (Solaris)
In SunGs, the abstraction of sockets is built into the kernel. Calls such as socket. connect and accept
must cross the system call boundary, and will generate audit records.
However, in System V, the communication abstraction is streams. A stream is a data flow path between
two endpoint entities. Streams are a generic abstraction for data flow - they are used to implement terminal
drivers, sockets and FIFOs in System V versions of UNIX. In particular. the abstraction of sockets is
provided by a library built on top of the kernel. Socket calls in this library execute a series of getmsg,
putInsg and ioctl calls to interface with System V streams. No audit data is generated that specifically
mentions that a socket call has occured. The audit data only shows the System V stream interface calls.
This makes it difficult to write patterns to detect such simple network based attacks as port-flooding and
port-walking. A port-flood is where an abnonnally high number ofconneclions are received on a single port.
The idea is to use up kernel socket resources and denying network access to any other users. A port-walk
is a series of connections to ports which attempts to find services running on ports which may be exploited.
Both of these attacks could be detected from an audit trail which contained records for connect and
accept events. To simulate this. a wrapper library for the socket library must be written. This wrapper
library will generate an audit record to be placed in the audit file, and will then call the original socket library
call.




'" th.. _ccnnect rcudne ie the ey~tem eall "'
""tern in~ _eonneet I int e. etruet oock<lddr "n""",. int n""",l..,.l,
/" writ" ou~.,...,. Conn"Ct toutin" tlult will <;l..,..rato on oudit r"cord "f




'" <;l0n...at.. a ..ceke. token that roeordo tho infctl:\Otion "'
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f' write tnat .aeku tokan to tna audit trail ./
6.2 Auditing operations on symbolic liuks ou System V (Solaris)
Many of the patterns devised at the COAST lab needed information about system calls that were operating
on symbolic links. The pattern that detects the exploitation of the xterrn bug, for example. can detect
exploitations by seeing if the inode for the log file has changed between the creation and accessing of the
file.
Unfonunately. this pattern cannot be used as is with the Basic Security Module C210gging provided by
Sun with Solaris 2.4. For this pattern to work, the audit trail would need to provide. at least, the following
information:
I. execve: ERROR, EUID, RUID, PID, and program name
2. creat: ERROR, PID, initial file name, final file name. and inode number
3. open: ERROR, PID, initial file name, final filename, and inode number
4. close: ERROR, PID, inode, initial file name, and final file name
5. chown: ERROR, PID, inode. initial file name, and final file name
6. chmod: ERROR, PID, inode, initial file name, and final file name
7. access: ERROR. PID, inode, initial file name, and final file name
8. stat: ERROR, PID, inode, initial file name, and final file name
The only items that require explanation are the file names. Ifwe have a symbolic link syml that points to
a file fi 11 then a call to chmod ( n sym1 " ,mode) would require an audit trail record that would indicate
that the chmod system call was executed on the initial file name sym1 and the final file name fill. The
inode should be the one corresponding to the final name.
The audit trail generated by the Basic Security Module provided with Solaris 2.4 violates the file names
requirement. To see why this is important, consider the following fragment of a setuid C program called
xterrnbug:
/' Cecatc • log fLle called xtermbu9.1og '/
if[ eroatC·xton:!N9.1og·.01 ~ -1 I (
/. Tho p"rmi.iaR5 of the ceutcd fllo "",re 5''': to 0,,00000. Chango th....
to """,,"thing OII>re re""oJ14ble '/
Hc eh:so<lC·xtt=bug.10l1·.S_IRWllUIS_IRWXtiIS_IJUlXOI •• -1 I C
!print!l.tdtrr. 'Could not th4n9o tho perminion of file
xto rmbul1. I <>o\n·l,
,
) oho {
fprlntfCndere. 'Could not ereato lOll file "tcrmbul1.log\n·l,
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and an attack script that will exploit the vulnerability described in this document is calledxterrobug . exploit:
IJ/I>in'~h







This attack can not be detected by the pattern described in this document ifusing the Basic Security
Module logging in Solaris 2.4. The audit trail generated for this session, reformatted for clarity and brevity,
with the attacker called gol/urn. and the victim called krsul. is:
1 ""e"",,(2) - path./hCllllC/qollUl11/"te=l:luq.~"IIloit - rolD "ol1um - RI1ID
qollum
2 e"0",,,,(2) - path./uu/.bin/"""'od - ElIID qollUlll - RIIID 'lollum
1 mlaoodf21 - arqument.2,Oxl1b6,0I0de - ar~t,J.O"O,elov
4 "ath.I.OIOrclor/hcmo/gollum/"to=bog.10ll _ WID gollum _ RIIID
1I011u
•
5 c1.own(ZI - .r9WO"nt.2.0xl41.n.... Ule uiel - Grq=><nc.J.O"J41.nC>' file
."
6 p.th,I ...,rdor/h""""I'lollum/..t~=bu'l.10q - EllUl "ollmo - RI1m
'loUu
•
E\1ItI I<toul - III1ID ,,011\'"
chmod.lZI - argument.Z.OxIH.ncv ~il.. mocl~ - poth./h"""'~lkr~ullbreok.,.loa
EllID krou1 - RUID aall._
cX8<:vo(2) _ "ath./uor/l>in/cat _ rolD qoU"", _ RI1IO qoUum
1 ~"~<:vcfZI - "ath,/ho"",.,kr.UlIblnl"tonbolll - £UUl "".u1 - RlIID qoUum
B ~..~<:vcf21 - path./uor/blnlol~O'P - rolO 'lollUlll - RlIIO 'lollum
~ ""~cvof]l - parh./u.r/local/bln/"'" - EJJ:ID "o11_ - RlIID "ol1um
10 rcn"""'fZI _ "atb.I.CIOrclor/bOlllelllollum/xto<mhuq.10ll
11 parh.I.OIOrclorlh..... /'lollum/junk - WID 'lOll"", - RlIIO "oU.....
12 execvefZI _ path./uorlbinlln _ l!lJ:ID qoUum _ RlIID qollmo
IJ oyool.inkl2 I - t~"c. Ih""",~/kroullbreal<..olc - path. I . ..,rdor/h"""'/"oU.....I"t~
-.
.,~
14 WID gall_ - RIIID "all"'"
15 ..,..."",,(2) - poth, lu.r/bin/coc - &\lID 'loU"", - IWID "011",,,







Notice that in line 20, the audit trail indicates that the clunod(2l system call was made to the file
lhomes/krsul/breakJne. While this is ultimately true, it does little to help detect the exploitation of the
vulnerability. The pattern design specifically looks for a chrnod or chown to the same file name as the
creat but with different inode numbers. The audit trail should mention that the original call was made to
file xterrobug .log.
6.3 Write events are not audited
Some patterns need to detect WRITE events. However, in the Solaris BSM audit trail the write events are
subsumed under the OPEN event. So the audit trail for a write looks as follows (output of praudit):
heaeler,lJ6.2.openIZI - reGeI.writ~ .•Tu.. F~b 20 U:53:J4 1~96. ~ 846005000 Nee
pGth. /ho.../mc.ro~l>i.. /myIDI01'Iau<lit_elatG/e"ocotGbl~
"ttribu~~.1001 11, mc.ro~b1e.lIICro~b;:~.83886J8. 1~JOa5.0
Gobi~et. -Z.mc.ro"bi... moro~bio,moro"bie,mc.rOGbio,20085. O. 0 0 0.0.0.0
teturn, ouec03s. 4
The audit trail was gathered with the fw audit mask flag. This gathers data about file writes. The open
call is recorded, but the wri te call is not. The above audit trail corresponds to the following code fragment:
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ifl Ifd.Ope"l'./e"e=~able·.OJlUtlllll < 01 (
perrorl' ope'" '1,
exitlll,
pri,,~f!"l!:q>loit' vriti"ll ~o ex""u~abl.. , .. \"·I,
H! ""lte(fd. 'eb<;def". 61 ~ 61 (
i><'rrerl" ""i~e, '),
ftXitll) ,
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